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Stepparent Adoption: A Comparative Analysis of 
Laws and Policies in England and the United States 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Each year approximately one million children in the United States under the 
age of 18 become stepchildren, and one-half million adults become stepparents.! 
Between ten and fifteen percent of all households in the United States are 
stepfamilies.2 As the divorce and remarriage rates rise,3 the number of steprela-
I. R. ESPINOZA & Y. NEWMAN, STEPPARENTING 2-3 (1979) (published by the National Institute of 
Mental Health); B. MADDOX, THE HALF-PARENT: LIVING WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S CHILDREN 8-9 (1975). 
"Maddox enlisted the aid of demographer Paul Glick to estimate, using 1970 census data, that each year 
one million children under the age of 18 see a parent marry - 750,000 after a divorce, 200,000 after 
the death of a parent, and 50,000 as children of unwed parents." ESPINOZA & NEWMAN, supra this note, 
at 15. 
For the purpose of this Comment, the following definitions apply: 
A step family is a household unit in which one or both spouses have children from a previous marriage 
living most of the time in the same household. A stepfamily is formed when an adult marries someone 
with children, thereby becoming a stepparent to the children of a natural parent. Although a stepparent 
can marry a noncustodial natural parent or a parent with illegitimate children, in this Comment the term 
stepparent will refer only to someone who marries a custodial natural parent with legitimate children. 
A stepfather is someone who marries a woman with custody of her legitimate children, regardless of his 
previous marital status; a stepmother is someone who marries a man with custody of his legitimate 
children, regardless of her previous marital status. 
Steprelationships are the links, legal or otherwise, between a stepchild and a stepparent, created when the 
stepparent and a custodial natural parent marry. A remarriage does not create a stepfamily unless there 
are children from a previous marriage and, for this Comment, they reside with the remarried adults. 
ESPINOZA & NEWMAN, supra this note, at 2-3. 
Since approximately eighty percent of women divorced in the United States are granted custody of 
their children, most stepfamilies within the definition used in this Comment comprise a natural mother, 
her stepchildren, and a stepfather. Id. at 15. In this Comment, the term stepparent adoption refers to a 
successful (or unsuccessful) attempt to adopt one's legitimate stepchild. 
Background material for the Comment has come from legal and popular sources. For information on 
stepparenting dynamics, theory, and research, see generally these popular books on stepparenting: 
MADDOX, supra this note (a book frequently cited by other authors, both legal and popular); J. & W. 
NOBLE, How TO LIVE WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S CHILDREN (1977); E. & J. VIS HER, STEPFAMILIES: A GUIDE 
TO WORKING WITH STEPPARENTS AND STEPCHILDREN (1979) (intended for therapists and counselors; 
includes an overview of research). 
See generally these legal sources on the subject: Bissett-Johnson, Step-Parent Adoptions in English and 
Canadian Law, in THE CHILD AND THE COURTS 335 (I. Baxter & M. Eberts eds. 1978); Bodenheimer,New 
Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 10 (1975) 
(California law only); Hopkins & Benson, Adoption by Parent and Step-parent, 128 NEW L.J. 339 (April 6, 
1978) (English law only); Oppel, Step-parent Adoptions in Nova Scotia and British Columbia, 6 DALHOUSIE 
L.J. 631 (1981) (also discusses English law); Williams, Step-parent Adoptions and the Best Interests of the Child 
in Ontario, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 214 (1982) (also discusses English law); Note, Stepparent Custody: An 
Alternative to Stepparent Adoption, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 604 (1979) (California law) [hereinafter cited as 
Note, Stepparent Custody]. 
2. ESPINOZA & NEWMAN, supra note I, at 14. 
3. VIS HER, supra note I, at 38; MADDOX, supra note I, at 7. "Marrying more than once has never been 
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tionships will rise. 4 Yet, despite the prevalence of steprelationships, the step-
parent under current U.S. law "faces the problem of having neither rights nor 
dearly defined obligations with respect to the [step ]child."5 Marrying someone 
with children - becoming a stepparent - confers neither parental rights nor 
duties.6 To many stepparents, adoption of the stepchild seems the only way to 
establish parental standing.7 
Although an adoption does establish a legal parental relationship between the 
stepparent and the stepchild, the adoption also severs the child's relationship 
with the nonadopting natural parent.8 But U.S. law offers no alternative,9 no 
middle course that would grant parental rights and impose obligations on the 
stepparent while retaining the emotional and legal relationship of the child and 
the noncustodial natural parent. lO 
England presents a model for an alternative middle course. The occurrence of 
stepparent adoptions in that country had shown a similar pattern of steady 
increase.'! In 1963, 17,782 adoptions were granted in England and Wales. I2 Of 
so popular in contemporary history: one in every three American marriages and one out of every four 
British marriages is a remarriage for one or both partners." [d. 
4. [d. at 7-8. It is difficult to determine the exact number of steprelationships, since the "Census 
Bureau seems reluctant to ask pointed questions." VISHER, supra note I, at 38. This is considered a 
sensitive subject by the Bureau, which fears that asking such an "embarrassing question" would 
jeopardize the accuracy of other questions on the census form. MADDOX, supra note I, at 8. A booklet 
published by the National Institute of Mental Health reports that "[s]tepparenting as a subject for 
research and inquiry is at such a primitive stage that it becomes a challenge merely to locate relevant 
literature." ESPINOZA & NEWMAN, supra note I, at II. Researchers estimate that there were eight million 
stepchildren in the United States in both 1964 and 1970, but by 1975, there were 15 million stepchil-
dren; in 1977, one in every six children was a stepchild. VISHER, supra note I, at 37-38. 
5. Bodenheimer, supra note I, at 45. 
6. See infra sections II.C and III.C, Areas of Concern. See generally, e.g., Comment, Cinderella Revisited, 
10 SAN. FERN. V. L. REv. 103 (1982) (duties of stepparents in California). For example, a stepparent is 
not responsible generally for support of a stepchild, nor can the stepparent give or withhold consent for 
the stepchild's medical treatment. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 159, 161 (1978 & Supp. 1982). 
7. Since the adoption process confers parental rights and duties on the adopter, a stepparent can 
acquire parental rights and duties by adopting the stepchild. See Note, Srepparent Custody, supra note 1, at 
605-06. More than half - 9,222 of 13,559, or 68 percent - of the adoptions in California in 1974 
involved a stepparent. [d. at 605 n.9; see also Bodenheimer, supra note I, at 13 n.4. Nationally the figure 
is more than one-third of all adoptions granted. MADDOX, supra note I, at 167. Data is not available on 
the number of adoptions requested by a stepparent but denied by the court, for reasons such as 
unfitness of the stepparent, lack of consent from the non~ustodial natural parent, refusal by a court to 
waive that consent, and the best interests of the child. The number of adoptions requested is obviously 
higher than the number of adoptions actually granted. See generally Comment, A Survey of State Law 
Authorizing Stepparent Adoptions without the Noncustodial Parent's Consent, 15 AKRON L. REv. 567, 569 
(1 982)[hereinafter cited as Comment, Survey]. 
8. See Bodenheimer, supra note I, at 45. This occurs whether the nonadopting natural parent has 
abandoned the child or is still engaged in an ongoing relationship with the child. If the adoption is 
granted, the law no longer recognizes any relationship between the child and the nonadopting natural 
parent. See id. 
9. [d. 
10. See id. 
II. MADDOX, supra note 1, at 167; L. RIMMER, FAMILIES IN Focus 51 (1981). 
12. Hopkins & Benson, supra note 1, at 339. 
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those, 1,888 - 10.6 percent - were adoptions of legitimate children by their 
natural and stepparents. 13 By 1976, the total number of adoptions had not 
increased, but the proportion of stepparent adoptions had risen startlingly: of 
17,621 total adoptions, 7,838 - 44.5 percent - were stepparent adoptions of 
legitimate children,14 a fourfold increase in thirteen years. 
Without intervention, the trend would have continued to rise with the divorce 
and remarriage statistics.15 But a dramatic change in social policy, enacted into 
law as the Children Act 1975,16 has reversed the trend. Adoptions granted to 
natural and stepparents decreased to fewer than 5,000 in 1977, the year after the 
Children Act became eflectiveP 
The Children Act requires the court to consider whether adoption by the 
stepparent is conducive to the immediate and long-term welfare of the child, or 
whether the child's welfare would be better served by granting the stepparent 
custody jointly with the custodial natural parent. 18 The practical effect of this 
legislation is that most applications by stepparents for adoption of a stepchild are 
dismissed, and stepparents who want legal parental status must pursue a claim 
for joint custody.19 The hindrance is intentional, since "[i]n Britain, the prevail-
ing view is that to encourage stepparent adoption is bad social policy."20 
The same statement cannot be made about the prevailing view in the United 
States. Far from discouraging stepparent adoption, some states waive the con-
sent to the adoption of the parent who lost custody in the divorce, regardless of 
reason.21 "The assumption is that since the child will be living with the stepparent 
anyway, his legal rights and obligations should coincide with the family relation-
ship."22 Clark, author of a treatise on family law, disagrees: "If this is good social 
13. [d. Another 2.636 adoptions (14.8 percent) were adoptions by natural and stepparents of 
illegitimate children, in order to legitimate them; the remainder, 74.6 percent, were adoptions by 
strangers, the so-called conventional adoption. [d. 
14. [d. Another 3,989 adoptions (22.6 percent) were by natural and stepparents of illegitimate 
children; the remainder, 32.9 percent, were conventional adoptions by strangers. [d. 
15. See REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN, CMND. 5107, ~ 19 
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Houghton Report, after the committee's chair, Sir Houghton]. 
16. Children Act 1975, ch. 72. The first law in Great Britain authorizing adoption was the Adoption 
of Children Act 1926, which made legal adoptions possible. but did not deal with the activities of 
adoption societies or agencies. Revisions recommended by a 1936 study committee became the Adop-
tion of Children (Regulation) Act 1939, and later, the Adoption of Children Act 1949. In 1950 the acts 
were consolidated, with minor amendments, into the Adoption Act 1950. The Hurst Committee 
recommended changes, which became the Adoption Act 1958. Other minor changes, enacted in 1960, 
1964, and 1968, dealt primarily with international adoption orders. The study committee chaired by Sir 
William Houghton recommended the reforms that became the Children Act 1975. Houghton Report, 
supra note 15, at ~~ 11-13. 
17. L. RIMMER, FAMILIES IN Focus 51 (1981). 
18. Children Act 1975, ch. 72, sees. 3, 10(3). 
19. Hopkins & Benson. supra note I, at 339. 
20. MADDOX, supra note I, at 170. 
21. [d. 
22. !d. 
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policy, it is in sharp conflict with the ideas of parental right, and it does seem 
hard on the parent who does not have custody."23 
Very little study of the issue of whether stepparent adoption is good social 
policy has occurred in the United States.24 State laws address the issue 
haphazardly, with some states facilitating stepparent adoption25 and others hin-
dering it.26 No state, however, approaches the issue in the manner now used in 
England, nor has there been any legislative study published like the Houghton 
Report.27 
This Comment compares stepparent adoption in the United States and En-
gland. Following an overview of the history, the standard procedures, and the 
legal consequences of adoption is an explanation of the motivations underlying 
requests for stepparent adoption, such as the desire to unify the stepfamily or 
the desire to conceal a previous marriage. The author then examines the legal 
status of the stepparent in the United States, with emphasis on the extent of 
parental rights and duties of the stepparent, visitation rights of the stepparent at 
the death or divorce of the custodial natural parent, and the duration and 
termination of steprelationships. The author describes current U.S. law on two 
areas of concern to stepfamilies, the succession rights of the stepchild and the 
issue of the stepchild's surname. 
Following an overview of the new English policy of discouraging stepparent 
adoption, the Comment shows how English laws deal with the same questions of 
parental rights and duties of stepparents, visitation, termination of the steprela-
tionship, succession rights, and surnames. Finally, the author suggests that the 
English approach to stepparent adoption be followed in the United States. 
II. STEPPARENT ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Background 
Adoption is a statutory creation; it did not exist III the common law.28 In 
essence, adoption is the legal process by which "a child acquires parents other 
23. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 636 (1968) (family law in the United States). 
24. See generally ESPINOZA & NEWMAN, supra note I, at 11 (difficult even to find literature on the 
topic). The two major articles on the subject in the United States are written on California law. See 
Bodenheimer, supra note 1, and Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1. 
25. E.g., state law collected in Comment, Survey, supra note 7, at 573-77; for example, VA. CODE 
§ 63.1-225 (1980) (court may grant petition for adoption without a required consent if the court finds the 
person is withholding consent "contrary to the best interests of the child"). 
26. E.g., state laws collected in Comment, Survey, supra note 7, at 587-93; for example, CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 45-63(a) (West Supp. 1981) (stepparent adoption permitted but only after child has been 
adjudicated free for adoption). 
27. See generally Houghton Report, supra note 15, and infra section HI on the English approach to 
stepparent adoption. 
28. S.M. CRETNEY, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAw 531 (3d ed. 1979) (English family law); CLARK, supra 
note 23, at 603. 
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than his natural parents and parents acquire a child other than [their] natural 
child."29 Although the practice has roots in antiquity30 and has been recognized 
in the civil law since before Justinian, the common law did not inherit Roman-
style adoption31 as the civil law countries did.32 Statutes authorizing adoption 
were a relatively late development in Great Britain and the United States33 and 
differed from civil laws on adoption by emphasizing concern for the welfare of 
the child, rather than the continuity of the adopter's family.34 
While particular details vary, the adoption statutes of the fifty states are 
remarkable for their "gratifying similarity."35 The statutes describe who may 
adopt,36 who may be adopted,37 whose consent is required,3s the circumstances 
29. CLARK, supra note 23, at 602. 
30. See generally Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient o,nd Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956). The 
practice was known to the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Greeks, and Germans and is 
mentioned in the Hebrew Testament./d. at 743-45. See generally 2 c.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 3 (1972). 
31. Roman law permitted two forms of adoption: 
The form called adoptio applied to unemancipated children, and brought about their transfer 
from the family and authority of their natural father to that of their adoptive father .... It is 
this form of adoption which is the precursor of our modern adoption proceeding. The other 
form of Roman adoption, called adrogatio, applied to adults and is of less importance to us. 
CLARK, supra note 23, at 602. See also Huard, supra note 30, at 743-47. 
32. See generally Huard, supra note 30, at 745. 
One influence on United States adoption law can be traced to the Spanish and French law 
which acquired a firm and lasting pied-a-terre in Louisiana and Texas. French and Spanish 
jurisprudence was largely modeled on Roman civil law and adoption was a well established 
practice in those countries. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to find cases of Roman-style adoption in the early volumes of 
the Louisiana and Texas case reports, long before the practice had been generally sanctioned 
elsewhere in the United States. 
[d. at 747. 
33. O. STONE, FAMILY LAW 225 (1977) ("At the end of the nineteenth century it became clear that 
Great Britain was among the few so-called 'advanced' countries without any legal institution of adop-
tion."); Huard, supra note 30, at 748 ("The earliest adoption statute [in a common law jurisdiction] is 
variously reported to be that of Mississippi in 1846 and Massachusetts in 1851"). Huard suggests a 
reason for the English reluctance to legalize adoption: 
Our jurisprudence was largely acquired by inheritance from England. The English had an 
inordinately high regard for blood lineage and consequently the practice of adoption never 
acquired a foothold there. The primitive underotanding of adoption required the adoptee to 
become a member of the adopter's family, to acquire a quasi-interest in the adopter's property 
while the latter lived and to succeed to such property upon the adopter's death. But to the 
English, heirs meant legitimate children who were heirs of the blood. This was an unalterable 
maXIm ... . 
[d. at 745-46 (footnotes omitted). Roman-style adoption was not legally possible in England until the 
Adoption Act 1926. !d. at 746. 
34. Huard, supra note 30, at 748-49. 
35. !d. at 750. 
36. The right to adopt is purely statutory and can be denied to a person judged unfit. Usually the 
adopter must be over the age of majority, except in cases of married couples or a person adopting his or 
her own natural child. The right is limited to natural persons; corporations, firms, and societies cannot 
adopt. Relatives can adopt when permitted by statute. Some states require the adopter to be a specified 
number of years older than the adoptee. Marital status is neither a bar nor a requirement in most states. 
Residency mayor may not be required. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons §§ 13-17 (1972). In England, 
requirements that prohibited a single male from adopting a female child have now been removed; 
however, all adopters must be at least 21 years of age. See generally CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 538-42. 
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under which a required consent may be waived,39 the legal procedures to be 
followed,40 and the effects of the decree. 41 
In the simplest terms, an adoption decree "divests the natural parents of all 
rights and duties respecting the child and vests such rights and duties in the 
adoptive parents."42 The adoptive parents become entitled to custody of the 
child, and the natural parents lose their entitlement to custody;43 the adoptive 
parents become responsible for support, and the natural parents cease to be 
37. Generally a person can be adopted even if the proposed adopter is his or her spouse. Minors or 
adults can be adopted. In the absence of express statutory prohibition, race and religion of adoptee and 
adopter are not bars to adoption. Some states prohibit adoption of one's own legitimate child. 2 C.J.S. 
Adoption of Persons §§ IS-24 (1972). In England, the adoptee must be under IS and must never have 
been married. See generally CRETNEY, supra note 2S, at 538-42. 
3S. Generally the consent of both natural parents of a legitimate child is required, unless one or both 
has lost parental rights through abandonment of the child or other conduct that permits a court to 
dispense with consent. If the child is in the care of a public or private licensed agency, the agency's 
consent is usually required. Consent of the guardian may be necessary, although consent is not required 
from a relative who has been caring for the child informally, unless so specified by statute. When the 
adoptee is older than a specified age, generally twelve or fourteen, the adoptee's consent may be 
required also. See CLARK, supra note 23, at 623-25. 
39. Required consents may be waived if doing so is in the best interests of the adoptee. The U.S. 
Supreme Court indicated in dicta, in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), that a statute terminating 
parental rights without a finding of unfitness may be an unconstitutional violation of due process. Some 
courts liberally construe the grounds on which unfitness may be based, so that failure to visit or to pay 
support for six months can be construed as abandonment and, thus, parental unfitness. See Comment, 
Survey, supra note 7, at 569. Traditional statutory grounds for dispensing with a required consent 
include abandonment, termination of parental rights (perhaps in the original divorce decree), mental 
incompetency, failure to consent due to prolonged unexplained absence, unavailability, or incapacity. 
D. BRIELAND & J. LEMMON, SOCIAL WORK AND THE LAW 380 (1977). 
40. 
When once it is determined that the child is eligible for adoption by someone, either because 
the appropriate person has consented, or because parental rights have been terminated, the 
next step in the process is the establishment of his ties with the adoptive parents. This step may 
occur as a result of the very hearing which made him eligible for adoption, and the two steps 
thus may be taken together. Or it may occur at a later time as a result of subsequent legal 
proceedings. 
CLARK, supra note 23, at 638. Usually the two steps are taken together in the case of a stepparent 
adoption. In an agency adoption, where the child has been placed for adoption with an agency, the two 
steps usually occur in separate stages. [d. 
41. "On a final decree of adoption the parents' rights are not merely suspended but are completely 
destroyed." 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 100 (1972). Adoption permanently establishes the legal 
relationship of parent and child between the adopter and adoptee, and neither the subsequent death of 
either party nor the marriage of the adoptee will forfeit the legal relationship. The adoptive parent 
acquires the rights and duties of natural parenthood; the natural parents and relatives are divested of 
all rights and duties toward the adoptive child. "The adoptive parents may not be compelled to permit 
the natural grandparents to visit, and communicate, with the child, and adoption has been held to vitiate 
a prior divorce decree vesting partial custody and visitation rights in a natural grandparent." [d. at 
§ 135. "With some exceptions adoption terminates all the rights of the natural parent with respect to the 
child, including the right of custody, parental control, and the right to see the child again or have any 
real knowledge as to its whereabouts." [d. at § 139. Death of the adoptive parent does not revive the 
parental relationship between the adoptee and the former natural parent. [d. 
42. CLARK, supra note 23, at 658. 
43. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 100 (1972). 
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liable for support.44 The decree customarily changes the child's surname to the 
surname of the adoptive father.45 The adoption statutes generally provide for 
issuance of a new birth certificate, so the adopted child's identity is concealed 
completely.46 Adoption proceedings and all records are usually confidential.47 
Following an adoption, the natural parents are legally no more than strangers to 
the now adopted child.48 The adoption generally has the practical effect of 
ending all relations between the adopted child and the natural parents.49 
The procedures and effects of the adoption laws were designed to meet the 
principal objective of "providing a secure family environment for children who 
cannot live with their original parents."50 Viewing the adoption procedures in 
light of that objective, "it becomes obvious that the advent of increasing numbers 
of joint adoptions by one natural parent and a step-parent forms a class of 
adoptions which was not within the contemplation of the original legislators, and 
for which the rules governing 'conventional' adoptions may not be appropri-
ate."51 For example, when a stepparent applies for an adoption, the rights of the 
natural parent, the stepparent'-s spouse, are not extinguished.52 This is an excep-
tion to the general rule that the rights of natural parents are extinguished by 
adoption.53 Other rules governing "conventional" adoptions54 are inappropriate 
in a stepparent adoption, such as concealing the identities of the natural par-
ents.55 
44. Id. at § 136. "However, where the child is adopted by the spouse of one of the natural parents, the 
relationship of that natural parent to the child is not terminated, and the legal incidents following 
adoption are the same as they would have been had both the natural parent and the spouse been the 
child's natural parents or his adoptive parents." Id. at § 139. 
45. A change of surname, although permitted, is not necessary for adoption. Id. at § 141. 
46. See CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 559. 
47. CLARK, supra note 23, at 616. 
48. See supra note 41. 
49. Although the natural parent no longer has a legal right to see the child, the natural parent may 
have contact with the child after the adoption, but only with the consent of the adoptive parents. But see 
In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 N.]. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986 (1979), in which the court, granting 
the adoption to the stepfather, held that an order for visitation by the natural father could be 
incorporated into the adoption decree. See also infra notes 178-80. 
50. Bodenheimer, supra note I, at 16. 
51. Oppel, supra note I, at 632. 
52. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 139 (1972). See supra note 44. 
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Some statutes expressly state this exception. CLARK, 
supra note 23, at 658-59. 
54. A "conventional" adoption is one in which the natural parents and the adoptive parents do not 
know one another before the adoption, and the adopters are strangers to the child before the adoption 
process begins. See Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 61. 
55. Some states will, upon request, issue a new birth certificate showing the adoptee to be the child of 
the adoptive parents. In the typical stepparent adoption, the child knows the natural parent and realizes 
that the stepparent is not the natural parent; the legal fiction of a new birth certificate thus seems 
foolish. See generally Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 611; CLARK, supra note 23, at 658-59. 
Stepparent adoptions have few of the features and almost none of the problems of ordinary 
adoptions. Ordinary adoptions serve the purpose of providing destitute, homeless and ne-
glected children with an improved environment, while stepparent adoptions merely formalize 
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A stepparent adoption differs from a conventional adoption in its main effect. 
The essence of adoption in the Common Law world has generally 
been the creation of legal ties where none previously existed, soon 
after the custodial transfer of the child has occurred. In practice (as 
opposed to law) step-parent adoptions usually change very little. The 
child is already legitimate, and so there is no stigma of illegitimacy to 
remove. The main effect of adoption in such a case is exclusionary: 
the exclusion and extinguishment of the natural [parent]'s rights.56 
Stepparent adoptions do not give the stepchild a home, do not remove illegiti-
macy, and do not create new emotional relationships.57 
The adoption laws, however, were intended in common law countries to meet 
the needs of homeless and orphaned children,58 with procedures designed to 
meet that goal and innovations developed to address problems in meeting the 
goal.59 The framers of these laws did not anticipate that stepparents would use 
the laws to adopt legitimate children whose natural parents have not surren-
dered them; the conventional adoption procedures seem ill-suited to stepparent 
adoptions. 
B. Motivations for Stepparent Adoptions 
Why then do stepparents seek to adopt the legitimate children who already 
reside with them? Maddox, author of a popular guide to stepparenting, de-
scribes the legal and psychological advantages to adoption of one's stepchil-
dren.60 "Adoption is permanent, and it gives the stepchild status and rights 
indistinguishable from any other child of the marriage. For many stepfamilies it 
spells emotional security. The stepparent need not fear losing the child, and the 
child's natural anxiety about the stepparent withdrawing affection will be allayed 
.... "61 Other commentators, however, ascribe less loving motivations to the 
parties, reporting that often "the reasons behind the application involve insecu-
an existing relationship. Stepchildren are generally older than children in ordinary adoptions. 
Because stepparent adoptions rarely involve infants, there is a good possibility that the 
stepchild will remember and have personal ties with the noncustodial parent. Finally, unlike in 
ordinary adoptions, a denial of a stepparent's petition does not result in the removal of the 
child from the home. 
Note, SupfJaTem Cu.stod" supra note I, at 611-12. 
In California, the procedure for a stepparent adoption is different from the procedure Jor an 
ordinary adoption. Petitioners file consent documents with the county clerk, not with the Department of 
Social Services, and adopters need not be ten years or more older than the child, as is usually required. 
/d. at 612 n.44. 
56. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336. 
57. S •• generally id. 
58. CLARK, supra note 23, at 658-59. 
59. [d. 
60. MADDOX, supra note I, at 169-70. 
61. [d. 
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rity and a lack of confidence (particularly after a failed marriage) in the relation-
ship between the child and the step-parent."62 The members of the stepfam-
ily may be motivated also by a desire to make the stepchild feel more a part of the 
family.63 The stepfather may want to adopt for stronger parental standing,64 and 
the two adults may hope that the children will forget the natural parent and 
grow closer to the stepparent when the natural parent's visits cease.65 For the 
natural parent, consent to the adoption may come from a desire to be free of the 
child support obligation.66 
Perhaps, theorizes a social worker, the stepfather hopes that upon giving the 
child his surname and assuming full parental responsibility, disagreements with 
the natural mother over the child's behavior will end.67 Professor Bissett-Johnson 
mentions a Canadian case in which the court held that the adoption "was 
necessary for the step-mother's feelings so that she need no longer fear that she was 
a mere surrogate mother."68 
Another commentator emphasizes the role of the natural mother in urging the 
stepfather to adopt, even though she already has custody of the children.69 The 
commentator speculates that there may be considerable hostility between the 
mother and her ex-husband, and adoption would permit her to have nothing 
more to do with him.70 The mother and stepfather may want to have children 
and prefer that all the children bear the same surname.71 This had been the 
express object of an adoption that was denied by the English Divisional Court.72 
The judge considered the motive - change of the children's surname - to be 
insufficient ground for an adoption.73 
The motivations described thus far arise from the emotional and personal 
needs of the involved adults. Some stepfamilies, however, are motivated to 
pursue adoption because of the inadequate position of a nonadopting stepparent 
under present U.S. law: "[T]he stepfather may wish to have the security of an 
62. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336. 
63. [d. 
64. [d. 
65. /d. Another commentator suggests that stepparents seek adoption because they feel insecure and 
have no confidence in their relationship with their stepchildren. "He argues that these psychological 
and emotional problems stem from the fact that the child is not and never can be a natural child. As 
such, he concludes that the legal device of adoption cannot solve them." Note, Stepparent Custady, supra 
note I, at 610 n.35 (quoting Hoggett, Adoption by Stepparents, 17 SOLICITORS' J. 606, 608 (1973». 
66. See Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336. 
67. Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 610 n.35 (quoting J. ROWE, PARENTS, CHILDREN AND 
ADOPTION 281 (1966)). 
68. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 343 (emphasis added) (quoting Re Children of Alexandra Edith 
Carter, 15 N.S.R.2d 181,215 (Ct. App. 1976». 
69. Williams, supra note I, at 214-15. 
70. [d. 
71. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336-37. 
72. Re D., 1973 Fam. 209, quoted in Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 338. 
73. [d. 
478 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII, No.2 
order, not only so that he feels that the children 'belong' to him, but also because 
he would then automatically be entitled to custody of them should the mother 
die or become incapacitated; .... "74 This concern arises because stepparenthood 
alone carries no rights under the common law.75 
Other areas of concern that impel stepparents to pursue adoption also derive 
from the law's treatment of the steprelationship. The laws of testate and intestate 
succession operate to exclude members of the stepfamily from inheriting from 
one another. 76 Stepparents may be denied custody of, or even visitation with, 
their stepchildren after the death or divorce of the custodial natural parent.77 
The lack of parental rights of the stepparent, including the right to consent to 
emergency medical treatment of the stepchild, and of parental duties, including 
the duty to support the stepchild during and after the marriage that created the 
steprelationship, is also a matter of great concern to stepfamilies. 
C. Areas of Concern 
1. Parental Rights and Duties 
The parental rights and duties vested in a natural parent by the common law78 
are not automatically acquired by the person who marries someone with children 
and thereby becomes a stepparent.79 Generally the intent to act parentally,80 to 
74. Williams, supra note I, at 214; see also Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 608-10. 
75. See, e.g., Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 605; MADDOX, supra note I, at 20,27, 163-64; 
Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "SIJiP" Relationship: Cinderella RevisilJid, 4 FAM. L.Q. 209, 211 (1970). 
76. See infra section II.C.2. 
77. See infra section 1l.C.4. 
78. Many of the common law rights and duties of a parent have been codified, e.g., the duty to 
support. The following rights and duties are vested by the common law in a natural parent: the right to 
control, i.e., determining how and where the child will spend time (also called the right to custody); the 
right to discipline; the right to access, i.e., enjoying the child's company and companionship; the duty to 
protect and maintain; the duty to educate and the right to choose the manner of education; the right to 
determine religious upbringing; the duty to provide, and the right to consent to, medical treatment; the 
right to select the infant's surname; the right to the child's services; the right to control emigration; the 
right to consent to marriage and to adoption; the right to appoint a guardian; the right and duty to 
administer the child's property; the right to act as 'next friend' in legal proceedings and the duty to 
serve as guardian ad litem in the same. See generally H. BEVAN & M. PARRY, CHILDREN ACT 1975 
~~ 210-25 (1978); CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 431-36. 
79. See, e.g., Note, SlJipparent Custody, supra note I, at 605; MADDOX, supra note I, at 163; Berkowitz, 
supra note 75, at 211. 
Id. 
80. NOBLE, supra note I, at 122. 
The crucial item is what your intentions really are. The question most courts ask is whether 
your attitude toward the child means that you intend to care for her and treat her as a member 
of your family. If you have taken over the raising of the child and you and your mate are 
paying the bills too, then you have a legal obligation to continue doing so unless the child 
already has a parent willingly paying support. If this happens, then, while you may have 
welcomed the child into your family and even have thought of him as a family member, you 
aren't in loco parentis - at least not from a legal standpoint. 
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place oneself within the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, 81 is necessary 
before a limited duty to support exists.82 Writers of popular books on step-
parenthood advise that acting parentally may carry an obligation to support, but 
that the stepparent can shed that obligation merely by changing the intent.83 
Maddox describes the status of in loco parentis as a status anyone can assume, 
relative or stranger, by giving the "child the protection normally expected of a 
parent. In America, however, the stepparent who wants to shed the role can 
usually do so at will. He simply ceases to maintain the child .... "84 Thus 
stepparenthood, unlike parenthood, does not create a duty to support by virtue 
of the status alone.85 A person must intentionally assume the obligations incident 
to parenthood, that is, intentionally place oneself in loco parentis, before a duty to 
support can be construed to exist.86 
In the United States, the duty to support, if found to exist, generally ends at 
divorce;87 cases conflict on whether the duty terminates at the death of the 
custodial natural parent.88 Statutes imposing a support duty on stepparents are 
in derogation of the common law and thus are strictly construed.89 But whether 
support is statutorily required of a stepparent or is imposed by the common law 
doctrine of in loco parentis, no other parental rights are granted a stepparent by 
virtue ofthat status alone.90 A stepparent thus can be required to pay the medical 
bills of a stepchild while being unable to consent legally to the medical treatment 
of the child. 
81. "A person is said to stand in loco parentis [in place of the parent] when he puts himself in the 
situation of a lawful parent without going through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption." 59 AM. 
JUR. 2d Parent and Child § 88 (1971). 
82. The duty is limited because it qn end by the intention of the parties to cease the relationship, or 
by the death or divorce of the stepparent and natural parent. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Mise. 2d 36, 
402 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1978) (liability for stepchild is collateral to valid marriage between stepparent and 
natural parent; once marriage ends, by death, divorce, or any other means, stepparent relationship and 
support obligation end). 
83. E.g., NOBLE, supra note I, at 124. 
Everything is based on your intention, so once you intend to treat the child as something other 
than a member of your family - as a boarder, perhaps, or a visitor - and you act accordingly, 
you have removed yourself from the parental role. At best you become a caretaker, sharing a 
home with someone else's child .. 
Id. See also sources cited supra note I; 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 88 (1971 & Supp. 1983). 
84. MADDOX, supra note I, at 165. 
85. /d.; see also 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 91 (1971 & Supp. 1983). 
86. MADDOX, supra note I, at 165,59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 91 (1971 & Supp. 1983). 
87. Annot., 75 A.L.R.3D 1129 (1977); Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Mise. 2d 36, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1978). 
88. Compare Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Mise. 2d 36, 402 N. Y.S.2d 171 (1978) (stepparent support obligation 
for stepchild ends at death of natural parent) with Jones v. Stautz, 5 Mise. 2d 185, 159 N .Y.S.2d 903 
(1957) (steprelation ship cannot be destroyed other than by divorce of the natural and stepparent). 
89. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Mise.2d 36, 38, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (1978). 
90. E.g., 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 91 (1971 & Supp. 1983). 
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2. Succession Rights 
Under the common law on intestate distribution, a stepchild is not entitled to 
an intestate share of the stepparent's estate.9! Without statutory intervention, a 
stepchild generally cannot take as an heir at law, regardless of the establishment 
vel non of an in loco parentis relationship.92 While this fact has been used to justify 
the granting of a stepparent adoption,93 it has also been offered as justification 
for refusal to do SO.94 
The simplistic response is that a stepparent who is concerned and who wants to 
provide for the stepchildren should write a will.95 However, "[c]omparatively few 
spouses seem to make wills,"96 and even the operation of testate law can cause the 
disinheritance of the stepchildren.97 This can occur despite a will intended to 
benefit the stepchildren. For example, assume the testator, in a loving effort to 
show that she cared for the stepchildren as if they were her natural children, 
bequeaths to "the children," without qualifier or differentiation.98 Testate law 
indicates that the term "children" refers to blood relatives only and does not 
encompass stepchildren.99 
91. "[T]he law of intestacy is wholly statutory .... Inheritance is not a vested right and the legislature 
has the power to modify or to take away any such right." Berkowitz, supra note 75, at 224, 225 n.68. 
92. [d. at 224. Accord Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 624. Note that some statutes, e.g., 
California Probate Code § 228, specify that a stepchild can inherit to prevent escheat, but only when no 
issue or other next of kin can be found. Berkowitz, supra note 75, at 224; see also Note, Stepparent Custody, 
supra note I, at 624 n.94 (California law adds the condition that the estate in question be community 
property from the deceased natural parent). 
93. Re Robert George Blunden, No. CH 27897 (Nova Scotia County Ct. Aug. I, 1979), reported in 2 
FAM. L. REV. 136 (1979). The judge thought that the adoption would benefit the child economically, 
since the boy's intestate or testate rights "will, as far as we can now tell, be in all likelihood much more 
substantial" under the stepfather than under the natural father. The judge thereby granted the 
stepparent adoption. 2 FAM. L. REv. at 139. 
94. Stoodley- v. Blunden, 17 R.F.L.2d 280 (N.S. App. Div. 1980), rev'g Re Robert George Blunden, 
No. CH 27897 (Nova Scotia County Ct. Aug. I, 1979), see supra note 93. 
[W]hat positive advantage will the child receive in the future which could not be obtained by 
preserving the non-consenting natural parent status [or] ... by alternative legal means. The 
[stepfather who seeks adoption] can provide for the economic security of the child, either by 
will or other means, without the necessity of depriving the child of his inheritance from his 
natural father. 
[d. at 284. See also Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 344 n.59 (discussing a Canadian case in which the 
COllrt said the stepfather could write a will ifhe was sincerely concerned about the stepchildren'S future 
welfare; adoption refused). 
95. Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 625; NOBLE, supra note I, at 125. 
96. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 259. Accord NOBLE, supra note I, at 125-26. 
97. Berkowitz, supra note 75, at 223; NOBLE, supra note I, at 126-27. Suppose, in an extreme and 
hypothetical example, a newly wed natural parent and stepparent are in a car accident on their way 
'home from the wedding. Natural parent dies immediately, and stepparent a few hours later. Suppose 
further that neither has made a will; the stepparent, as surviving spouse, inherits a portion of the 
natural parent's estate. When the stepparent dies a few hours later, the stepparent's kin and issue 
inherit, leaving the natural parent's children, the stepchildren, disinherited from that portion of their 
parent's estate. 
98. This example is from NOBLE, supra note I, at 126. 
99. Berkowitz, supra note 75, at 223, (citing Barnes v. Greenzebach, 1 Edw. Ch. 41, 28 A.L.R.3d 1307, 
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Adoption by the stepparent resolves the problem, since an adopted child 
becomes the heir of the former stepparent, taking as if the natural child. IOO The 
child loses all intestate rights to the estates of the nonadoptive parent and 
relatives,lol although the nonadoptive parent can, of course, choose to name the 
child in a will, even after adoption has severed the legal relationship.lo2 (Curi-
ously, unless the adopting stepparent's relatives also choose to name the child 
specifically in their wills, the child does not acquire, despite the adoption, any 
intestate rights in the estates of these relatives. 103) 
A parent generally inherits a minor child's estate, but adoption alters this 
distribution: without adoption, the noncustodial natural parent shares any estate 
with the custodial natural parent; after adoption, the former stepparent dis-
places the nonadoptive natural parent. I04 In every circumstance just described, 
however, the position of the custodial natural parent and relatives remains 
unaltered by the stepparent adoption. lOS 
3. Surnames 
The question of whose surname a child bears is a question more of emotion 
than of reason. lOS Bissett-Johnson reports: 
1311 (N.Y. 1831)). This rule can be overturned if an ambiguity is found on the face of the will. 
Berkowitz describes a case in which the testator bequeathed her estate equally to her "beloved children," 
when in fact she had one child and six stepchildren. Finding a close relationship between her and the 
stepchildren, and noting her advanced age and the fact that the will had been drawn by a lay person, the 
court held that the ambiguous term included the stepchildren. Berkowitz, supra note 75, at 223-24 
(citing Re Estate of Gehl, 39 Wis.2d 206, 159 N.W.2d 72 (1968». 
100. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 559; Bissett-Johnson, supra note 1, at 337; CLARK, supra note 23, at 
659. But see Sherrin, AMpted arul Legitimated Children, 128 NEW L.J. 101 (1978) (in English law, adoption 
does not permit descent of peerage or of a title of honor, nor of property limited to devolution with 
such peerage or title of honor; adoption cannot eliminate a child's right to the same, nor is a pension 
payable to child at time of adoption eliminated by the adoption). 
101. CLARK, supra note 23, at 659-60. "[T]his is the universal rule today and is specifically provided 
for in most states' adoption or inheritance statutes." I d. 
102. See generally CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 559; Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1, at 605, 610, 
624. 
103. CLARK, supra note 23, at 660. 
When the adopted child claims an intestate share in the estate of a person related to his 
adoptive parents, or, in other words, when he seeks to inherit through the adoptive parents, he 
has been somewhat [un]successful, although the modern statutory trend is in the direction of 
approving his claim. The case authorities have taken the familiar position that since adoption 
was unknown to the common law the adoption statutes must be strictly construed. Therefore, 
unless the application statute expressly permitted the adopted child to inherit through his 
adoptive parents, he could not do so. 
Id. at 660. 
104. See CLARK, supra note 23, at 663. 
105. "[W]here the adopted child is deceased and claims to his estate are made by his adoptive parents 
or other kindred, and by his natural relatives, the position of the great majority of states is that the 
adoptive parents and kindred inherit and the natural relatives do not, again with the exception that a 
stepparent adoption should not affect the rights of the natural parent married to the stepparent." 
CLARK, supra note 23, at 661. 
106. See infra text accompanying notes 316-18. Since the mother is most often the custodial parent, a 
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A related reason [for stepparent adoption] is to give the child the 
same name as her mother and her step-father, and indeed the 
question of the name often has a symbolic importance which those 
practising outside this area of family law totally fail to comprehend. 
It symbolizes the sort of relationship that it is hoped to create within 
the new family.lo7 
Other commentators mention the desire for a single family name as a strong 
motivating factor in seeking a stepparent adoption. lOB Judges and commentators 
have criticized the use of adoption merely to change a child's surname, calling 
the action an attempt to conceal a previous failure at marriage109 or to deprive 
the natural father of his heritage, as symbolized by the passing of the family 
name.11° 
The common law allows individuals to change their names at will, absent an 
attempt to defraud.1l1 The traditional change of a woman's name at marriage, 
for instance, is a change by common law rather than by statutory requirement. 1l2 
The common law also allows parents to give their child any surname they 
choose.113 This right, however, is unlike the other parental rights,114 which are 
new stepfamily usually comprises a custodial mother, her husband, and her children from the previous 
marriage; it sometimes also includes children from the new marriage and (rarely) children from his 
previous marriage. Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1, at 605 n.9. Since most women change their 
surnames, by custom, upon marriage, U. STANNARD, MARRIED WOMEN v. HUSBANDS' NAMES: THE CASE 
FOR WOMEN WHO KEEP THEIR OWN NAME 1 (1973), the concern arises because the mother has the 
stepfather's name and the children have the natural father's surname. 
107. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336-37. 
108. See, e.g., Oppel, supra note 1, at 635; Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1 at 610 n.35. 
109. E.g., Wolfe v. Cherrett, 28 N.S.R.2d 17,32 n.23 (N.S. App. Div. 1978) (father appealed an 
adoption granted despite his lack of consent; court dismissed adoption, because the expressed purpose 
of the adoption was to give the children the mother's new surname, probably, said the court, to disguise 
her previous marriage failure); Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1, at 610 n.35. 
110. See generally W. v. A. (child: surname), [1981]1 All E.R. 100 (C.A. 1980) (mother moving away 
with new husband cannot change children's name when natural father does not consent); Bissett-
Johnson, Name Changes, 4 ADOPTION AND FOSTERING 58, 61 (1978) ("children may need to feel that they 
have not had their good name filched from them by their mothers end their ties with their fathers 
weakened"). 
Ill. E.g., Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214,351 A.2d 917 (1976);see generally STANNARD, supra note 106. 
112. See STANNARD, supra note 106, at 22; see also 65 C.J.S. Names §§ 11(1), 11(2) (1966); Stuart v. 
Board of Supervisors of Elections, 226 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1973). A person may change his or her 
name by simply using a different name, as long as the usage is consistent and there is no intent to 
defraud by assuming a different name. See STANNARD, supra note 106, at 22. A person may also change 
his or her name by (,btaining a court order; generally a change-of-name statute does not affect or 
abrogate the common law right to change one's name without resort to legal proceedings. 65 C.J .S. 
Names § 11(2) (1966 & Supp. 1982) and cases cited therein. 
113. E.g., Donald J. v. Evna M.-W., 81 Cal. App. 3d 929, 147 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1978); Secretary of the 
Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977) (parents need not give 
child father's surname; they may use mother's maiden name hyphenated with father's surname), noted 
in W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 257 (1978). 
"The son of Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, born July 7,1973 was given the name Troy O'Donovan 
Garity." STANNARD, supra note 106, at 48. 
114. See supra note 78. 
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exercisable jointly or independently, in that it cannot be exercised unilaterally.1I5 
Courts in the United States have refused to permit mothers to change their 
children's surnames, either by usage or by court order.116 Post-divorce attempts 
to change a child's name to that of a nonadopting stepfather or to the maiden 
name of the custodial mother are largely unsuccessful. l17 
As Bissett-Johnson suggests, surnames are important symbols. liB The stepfam-
ily distressed by the difference in surnames may pursue a stepparent adoption to 
create a uniform family surname.1l9 The courts consider this to be an inappro-
priate reason for an adoption,12° yet under the present U.S. laws and cases, no 
other legal process is likely to result in a new surname for the stepchild.121 
4. Duration and Termination of the Steprelationship 
Adoption is permanent and irrevocable; a steprelationship IS neither.122 A 
sense of permanency is important to the emotional security of the new family 
unit,123 but whether the need for permanency is sufficient justification for grant-
ing a stepparent adoption is debatable. 124 The lack of legal permanency is clearly 
critical, however, in two instances: when the stepparent's spouse dies, leaving 
minor natural children, and when the natural parent and stepparent divorce. As 
115. When two or more persons have a parental right or duty jointly, anyone of them may exercise it 
without the involvement, agreement, or consent of the others, assuming no express disapproval of that 
exercise. A third party is entitled to rely on the exercise of a parental right by either party having the 
right, absent knowledge of the other right-holder's disapproval. At common law, all parental rights 
were vested in the father. Reforms have equalized the rights and authorities of mothers and fathers, so 
that all parental rights are now exercisable by either parent unilaterally, except the right to change the 
child's surname. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 436, 440; see also CLARK, supra note 23, at 245, 573. 
116. E.g., Petition for Change of Name for Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426 (W. Va. 1977) (despite change-
of-name statute, mother's petition denied while father is still supporting and taking an interest in child); 
Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (1975) (divorced mother enjoined from changing 
children's names from father's surname to hyphenated version of his surname and her maiden name). 
117. See supra note 116, and cases cited in 57 AM. JUR. 2D Names § 14 (Supp. 1983). 
118. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336-37. 
119. [d. 
120. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 109. 
121. Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 623. 
122. See, e.g., CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 527; MADDOX, supra note I, at 169; Oppel, supra note I, at 
635; Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 610-11. 
123. MADDOX, supra note I, at 169. See supra text accompanying note 61. "Adoption, because of its 
finality, will also put an end to any further custody battles between the natural parents," Oppel, supra 
note I, at 635, and end the disruption caused by visits from the natural parent, Bissett-Johnson, supra 
note I, at 336. 
124. See generally Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 340, 354 nn. 32 & 40. The author describes an 
English case in which the adoption was overturned because, although the stepfamily understandably 
desired emotional security, the children's best interests were served by having two fathers, natural and 
step, rather than only one. He also criticizes a Canadian case in which adoption was granted contrary to 
the father's wishes, because his attempts at visitation had disturbed the stepfamily. Bissett-Johnson 
suggests that termination of access for a while would have served the court's aims as well as stepparent 
adoption did. [d. See also supra note 65. 
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a general rule, stepparents have no rights in either instance.125 Stepparents fear 
that the noncustodial natural parent has a superior right to custody of the 
children, and that at the death of the custodial natural parent, custody of the 
stepchildren would revert to the surviving natural parent.126 In a steprelation-
ship of long standing and closeness, this fear is a strong incentive for seeking a 
stepparent adoption .127 
The fear is well-grounded, as U.S. law now stands. When custody is granted at 
a divorce, the noncustodial parent's right to custody is not barred, but rather is 
held in abeyance; 128 "upon the death of the [parent with custody], his or her right 
does not descend nor can it be transmitted, and therefore the right of the other 
spouse to the custody of the child revives or attaches as against third persons."129 
The right revives automatically. No modification of the original decree is neces-
sary, assuming, of course, that the decree did not permanently terminate the 
parental rights.130 
A few recent cases have granted custody to the stepparent following the death 
of the custodial natural parent. l3l But these cases depended on a successful 
125. "As against a third person, a parent is entitled to the custody of a child unless he is unfit for the 
task or the best interests of the child require that a third person have custody." 24 AM. JUR. 20 Divorce 
and Separation § 806 (1966). This rule prevails whether the controversy between the natural parent and a 
third person, i.e., the stepparent, arises because the custodial natural parent died or because the 
custodial natural parent and the stepparent divorced. Id. The burden of proving the natural parent's 
unfitness is on the stepparent who seeks the custody. Id. See also Halpern v. Halpern, 133 Cal. App. 3d 
297, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982) (right of natural parent to custody upon divorce from stepparent can 
only be interfered with if custody is seriously detrimental to child and award to non-parent is necessary 
for child's best interest; visitation also denied to stepfather in face of mother's objection); but see Gorman 
v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (stepmother granted custody of 13-year old stepson 
who did not know she was not his natural mother; natural mother dead, and natural father had abused 
child; custody in the best interests of child). 
126. See, e.g., Collins v. Gilbreath, _ Ind. App. _,403 N.E.2d 921 (1980) (court granted natural 
father custody of three children ten days after suicide of natural mother; stepfather, with whom the 
children lived, had no grounds for receiving custody; visitation, despite natural father's dissent, granted 
in the best interests of the children). The court found both men equally fit and capable of providing for 
the children. The children were "understandably confused and frightened, given the recency of their 
mother's suicide and the hastily called habeas corpus hearing to determine with whom they would live." 
Id. at 923. The trial court granted visitation because 
Gilbreath had loved and cared for the children as a father for two and one-half years. To 
abruptly end this close relationship and deny him the privilege of ever seeing the girls again 
would be unfair and traumatic to both Gilbreath and the three young girls. The children would 
in essence lose their second parent in ten days - one by suicide and one by court decree. 
Id. at 923. It is interesting that Gilbreath had not filed any pleadings or counterpetition in response to 
the natural father's habeas corpus request, nor did he provide the appellate court with a brief, nor had 
he ever requested visitation rights! A vigorous dissent contends an unrelated third party has no 
standing to receive visitation rights in the absence of a judicial finding that the natural parent is unfit. I d. 
at 924. 
127. E.g., Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1, at 628. 
128. 24 AM. JUR. 20 DivoTce and Separation § 806 (1966 & Supp. 1983). 
129. Id. 
130. Id.; if. Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 67 n.16 (Utah 1978). 
131. E.g., Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (stepmother of six children 
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showing that the natural parent is unfit, and they do not overturn the usual 
presumption in favor of a natural parent.132 If the natural parent does not seek 
court intervention and the stepparent and stepchildren simply continue living 
together after the death, the stepparent has no parental rights unless a court 
grants custodial or guardian status.133 
Appointment by the custodial natural parent of the stepparent as testamentary 
guardian134 does not ensure the stepfamily's continued existence. The common 
law will not permit enforcement of provisions in the deceased natural parent's 
will that divest the surviving natural parent of the right to custody.135 Statutes 
allowing a testamentary appointment usually provide that the appointment is not 
effective if there is a surviving natural parent.136 Thus, appointment of a steppa-
rent as testamentary guardian will not succeed, even if the noncustodial surviv-
ing natural parent does not object; given those circumstances, the court might 
appoint the stepparent as the stepchild's guardian of the person.137 
Although stepparents have obtained custody of minor stepchildren when the 
stepparent and natural parent divorce, 138 the grant of custody is made because of 
the child's best interests, not because the stepparent has any natural or legal right 
to assert.139 Custody is granted to the stepparent only because the natural parents 
granted custody of youngest, a 13-year old boy, whom she had been caring for since he was a few 
months old; custody in his best interests, rather than custody with the natural father who had abused 
him). See glml!rally Annot., 10 A.L.RAth 767 (1981). 
132. In Perry v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480,166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1980), the court held that 
a stepparent may not be granted visitation rights in a divorce proceeding on the ground that the court 
lacks jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the superior court in a divorce is limited to those minors who are 
"children of the marriage." Since the stepchild, who had lived with Perry from the age of nine months 
until the divorce when the boy was seven, was not Perry's child, he was not a child of the marriage. The 
superior court lacked jurisdiction over his custody and visitation. Comment, Perry v. Superior Court: Best 
Interest Standard Ignored in Deciding Stepparent Visitation, 5 J. Juv. L. 53 (1981)[hereinafter cited as 
Comment, Perry]. 
133. MADDox,supra note I, at 164. CJ. Re Ewing, 96 Idaho 424, 529 P.2d 1296 (l974);/n re N., 1974 
Fam. 40 ("It seems to me clear that the only wayan individual who is not one of the natural parents can 
acquire parental rights is by some formal legal process vesting in that person the so-called parental 
rights .... ") 
134. "The statutes of many states authorize the appointment of guardians of person or estate by will. 
Such guardians are known as testamentary guardians. Aside from the method of appointment, which is 
available only where authorized by statute, such guardians have the same duties as other guardians of 
the person or the estate." CLARK, supra note 23, at 245. In England, the appointment may be by will or 
by deed. See infra text accompanying notes 326-333. 
135. CLARK, supra note 23, at 581. 
136. Id. 
137. "In practice. the testamentary appointment is generally confirmed unless the guardian is unfit 
for the task." Id. If the other natural parent is alive. the testamentary appointment is void. If that 
natural parent cannot be located, however. or declines to accept custody or responsibility for the 
children. the stepparent may be appointed as guardian of the person at that point. This is not a 
testamentary appointment, even though the person appointed by the court coincides with the person 
(the stepparent) named in the deceased natural parent's will. 
138. E.g .• Gorman v. Gorman. 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also Annot.. 10 A.L.R.4TH 
767 (1981). 
139. See Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). But see Perry v. Superior Court. 
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are gravely unfit to retain or receive custody.140 Some courts have held, however, 
that they lack power to grant custody to a stepparent, reasoning that the court 
has jurisdiction in a divorce action to provide for the future care of children of 
the marriage, and stepchildren, by definition, are not children of the mar-
riage.HI 
Reliance on the in loco parentis doctrine will not enhance the stepparent's 
position in seeking custody of stepchildren. Although some courts have decided 
the in loco parentis relationship can end only if the stepparent and stepchild 
choose to end it,I42 most courts find that the relationship ends when the natural 
parent and stepparent divorce. H3 
5. Visitation Rights 
The issue of visitation is, like the issue of surnames, a source of anxiety in a 
stepfamily. One motive for stepparent adoption is to eliminate the noncustodial 
natural parent's right to visit,I44 while that parent may oppose adoption solely to 
preserve the right. 145 Commentatorsl46 and courts l47 have suggested that visita-
108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1980) (divorce court has no jurisdiction over stepchildren 
because they are not "children of the marriage"). 
140. See generally CLARK, supra note 23, at 573-78. 
141. See supra note 132. 
142. "The common law concerning termination of the loco parentis status is that only the surrogate 
parent or the child is able to terminate the status at will, and the rights, duties, and obligations continue 
as long as they choose to continue the relationship." Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). In this 
case, the trial court held that the stepfather was not entitled, as a matter of law, to a hearing on whether 
he should be allowed to visit his stepson, since one who cannot assert a custody right cannot assert a 
right to visitation. The supreme court remanded for a hearing, holding that if the stepfather were 
found to be in loco parentis to the boy, he would then be entitled to argue for visitation. Interestingly, the 
court held further that the stepfather has no legal duty to pay child support for the boy. It seems the 
rights of the in loco parentis status continue by the will of the child and stepfather, but the duties and 
obligations can cease, without disturbing the status. The supreme court, recognizing the inconsistency, 
ordered the lower court to determine whether the right to visitation, if ordered, should be coupled with 
an obligation to assist in the child's support. 
143. 
The relationship between stepparent and stepchild arises as a result of the remarriage of the 
natural parent. Liability for support of stepchildren is therefore collateral to the existence of a 
valid marriage. Once the marriage is dissolved, be it by divorce, death, or for any other reason 
whatsoever, the stepparent relationship ceases and with it the obligation of the stepparent to 
pay support for the stepchild. 
Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Misc. 2d 36, 38, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (Fam. Ct. 1978) (stepmother need not 
support stepdaughter after death of natural father). Cj. Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979) 
(hearing ordered to see if stepmother should get visitation despite having no legal right to custody; 
strong dissent, saying the right of the natural parent to control who sees the child outweighs the desire 
of an emotionally attached non-parent to interfere by visiting). 
144. E.g., Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336. 
145. Id. But cf. supra note 49 and case discussed therein. 
146. E.g., Williams, supra note I, at 229-30, suggests a form of limited access, either infrequent visits, 
perhaps once or twice a year, or provision of photographs and information to the nonadopting natural 
parent; Oppel, supra note I, at 653-58, suggests that visitation is the right of the child, not the parent, 
and cannot be terminated by adoption unless access is no longer in the child's best interests. 
147. E.g., In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 N.J. Super. 419,406 A.2d 986 (1979) (visitation 
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tion by the natural parent ought to continue after a stepparent adoption, al-
though it is questionable whether such an order is consistent with "the whole 
ethos of adoption, which is to create a new relationship between [adoptive] 
parent and natural child."148 
Visitation is also an issue in the stepparent custody situations described 
above.!49 While some courts have granted visitation to the stepparent upon 
divorce from the custodial natural parent, other courts suggest that such grants 
are ultra vires. 15o The same problem with visitation occurs when custody of the 
stepchild is given to the noncustodial natural parent after the death of the 
stepparent's spouse. 151 
Visitation is not an issue when a stepparent who has adopted the stepchild 
subsequently divorces.152 The stepparent who has become an adoptive parent is 
then in the same position as his or her spouse, the natural parent.153 The court 
applies the same criteria - best interests of the child, child's preference, and 
parental fitness - to decide custody and visitation in this divorce proceeding as 
the court would apply in a proceeding between two natural parents. 154 The 
natural parent may have an advantage over the former stepparent, however, 
because the natural parent has known the child longer, i.e., for the child's entire 
life,155 although theoretically this should not be considered by the court. 156 
granted to natural father after children's adoption by stepfather, despite objections from stepfather and 
natural mother; visitation held a right of the children; guardian ad litem appointed to enforce the 
children's exercise of the right despite the parents' opposition); Kerr v. McWhannel and McWhannel, 
16 R.F.L. 185 (B.C. Ct. App. 1974) ("I see nothing inconsistent in the child's being adopted by the 
[natural mother and stepfather], while at the same time the [divorced natural father] retains his rights 
of access. Adoption affects legal relationships of the child. Custody and access rights can be given in 
proper cases to persons who have no legal relationship to the child involved.") 
148. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336. See also Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 610 n.33; see 
further supra notes 49 and 132, and cases discussed therein. 
149. See supra section II.C.4. 
150. See Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W:2d 33, 36-39 (Ky. 1978); see also Comment, Perry, supra note 
132, at 64, in which the author argues that the Perry decision "makes adoption a requirement for 
stepparents if they want custody and visitation rights to attach." 
151. In Collins v. Gilbreath, _, Ind. App. _,403 N.E.2d 921 (1980), discussed supra note 126, the 
court held that the stepfather could visit the stepchildren, whose custody had reverted to the natural 
father following the suicide of the natural mother, because these visits would be in the best interests of 
the children. 
In so holding we do not intend to diminish the rights of a natural parent concerning his or her 
minor children. Nor do we intend to open the door and permit the granting of visitation rights 
to a myriad of unrelated persons, including grandparents, who happen to feel affection for a 
child. Our decision is explicitly limited to the type of factual situation presented by this case, 
i.e., where the party seeking visitation has acted in a custodial and parental capacity. 
[d. at 923-24 (citing Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979». 
152. See generally CLARK, supra note 23, at 658-59; Annot., I A.L.R.4TH 1270 (1980). 
153. See genera/ly Halpern v. Halpern, 133 Cal. App. 3d 297,303, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740, 743 (1982) 
(stepfather denied visitation because he was a "non-parent"). 
154. See generally CLARK, supra note 23 at 584-91. 
155. The natural parent has known the child the child's entire life. Because of this long-term 
relationship, custody to the former natural parent is less likely to be as disruptive to the child. Seefurther 
Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note I, at 626. 
156. The adoption technically eliminates the child's former parental relationship with the adoptive 
488 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII, No.2 
For the U.S. stepparent who has not adopted the stepchild, divorce from the 
custodial natural parent may end the steprelationship entirely.I57 Strong case law 
states that the obligation to support terminates with this divorce. I5H The step-
parent does not have a natural parent's right to visitation privileges. I59 Courts will 
grant visitation to a noncustodial natural parent over the objections of the 
custodial natural parent,160 but they seldom grant access to a "non-parent" if the 
custodial parent objects. I61 The stepparent is therefore unlikely to receive visita-
tion privileges if the custodial natural parent does not agree. 
Even obtaining standing to litigate the claim is difficult. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in Gribble v. Gribble, reversed the lower court's denial of a hearing on 
visitation for a stepfather being divorced by his stepchild's natural mother. I62 
The court had denied the hearing as a matter oflaw, since the statute in question 
referred to the visitation rights of "parents, grandparents and other relatives."163 
"For the appellant [stepfather] to assert visitation rights, he must, therefore, 
stand in the relationship of parent, grandparent, or other relative to this child, 
keeping in mind the paramount concern of the child's welfare."164 The lower 
parents. Since this adoptive relationship supersedes the extinguished natural relationship, see id. at 605 
n. 10-11, the adoptive parents, regardless of their former status vis-a-vis the adopted child, begin their 
new legal relationship with the child at the same moment in time. Thus, theoretically, the stepparent 
and the natural parent both became related to the child at the same instant; both have legally "known" 
the child for the same amount of time. See generally Schwartz v. Schwartz, 170 Ind. App. 241, 351 
N.E.2d 900 (1976) (custody granted to the former natural father; visitation to the former stepmother 
after her stepparent adoption and their subsequent divorce). 
157. E.g., Halpern v. Halpern, 133 Cal. App. 3d 297, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982); but see Gribble v. 
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), discussed supra note 142, which said in dicta that the relationship 
ends only by the will of the surrogate parent or the child, and a divorce neither sought nor desired by 
the stepparent does not terminate the relationship. 
158. E.g., Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978) (although the in loco parentis relationship may 
not end at divorce, the support obligation of a stepparent does); Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Mise. 2d 36,406 
N .Y.S.2d 171 (Fam. Ct. 1978) (obligation to support ends when marriage ends whether by death or 
divorce). 
159. But see Gribble, 583 P.2d at 67-68, in which the court was willing to consider visitation a privilege 
that accompanies in loco parentis status. "It is our belief that a stepfather may not be denied the right to 
visit his stepchildren merely because of his lack of a blood relationship to them .... Rejection of 
visitation privileges cannot be grounded in the mere status as a stepparent." Id. at 67-68 (quoting Spells 
v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977)). 
In other cases, the right to visitation has been granted because of the needs of the child, Looper v. 
McManus, 581 P.2d 487 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (stepmother granted visitation after divorce, although 
custody of stepson had returned to the natural mother, because the two-year old boy's mental health 
required continued contact); or because the court has held that the right belongs to the children, id. See 
also In re Adoption of Children of F., 170 N.]. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986 (1979) (visitation considered 
the right of the children, so they could visit natural father even after their adoption by stepfather; 
guardian ad litem appointed to enforce the children's right over the objections of the parents). 
160. Collins v. Gilbreath, _ Ind. App. _,403 N.E.2d 921 (1980). 
161. Id. However, "[tJhe mere protest of a parent who asserts that visitation by another person would 
somehow harm his or her child should not be enough to deny visitation in all cases." Id. at 923. See 
Halpern v. Halpern, 133 Cal. App. 3d 297, 312-13, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748 (1982). 
162. 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). 
163. Id. at 66. 
164. Id. 
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court, interpreting this language literally, had held that the stepfather had no 
right to visitation and thus no right to a hearing on the issue. 165 The supreme 
court acknowledged that a steprelationship confers no rights and imposes no 
obligations on the parties to it; 166 however, an in loco parentis relationship 
might.167 "If we are to find that the status ofloco parentis confers the same rights 
upon a stepparent as those enjoyed by a natural parent, then a fortiori, the rights 
of the stepparent cannot be terminated without an opportunity to be heard on 
the matter."168 The case was remanded to determine if the stepparent had 
established an in loco parentis status.169 
Other courts have ordered stepparent visitation or at least a hearing on the 
issue170 by holding that the statute in question does not explicitly prohibit such an 
order and that visitation in the case at bar is in the best interests of the step-
child.l7l 
In so holding we do not intend to diminish the rights of the natural 
parent concerning his or her minor children. Nor do we intend to 
open the door and permit the granting of visitation rights to a 
myriad of unrelated third persons, including grandparents, who 
happen to feel affection for a child. Our decision is explicitly limited 
to the type of factual situation presented by this case, i.e., where the 
party seeking visitation has acted in a custodial and parental capac-
ity.172 
The Collins court held that the stepfather was entitled to a hearing, and 
visitation was granted, in the best interests of the children. 173 
Visitation can be an issue when a natural parent and a stepparent apply to 
adopt the stepchildren, since adoption terminates the visitation rights, as well as 
all the other parental rights and duties, of the nonadopting natural parent.174 
Some courts, while granting the adoption to the natural and stepparents, have 
expressed a wish to grant continued visitation to the nonadopting natural par-
ent, either with the voluntary cooperation of the adoptive parentsl75 or as a 
165. !d. at 65. 
166. [d. at 66. 
167. [d. at 67. 
168. [d. 
169. !d. at 68. 
170. E.g., Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978) (hearing ordered): Simpson v. Simpson, 586 
S. W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979) (visitation granted in the best interests of the child). 
171. E.g., Collins v. Gilbreath, Ind. App_, 403 N.E.2d 921 (1980) (visitation granted to stepfather). 
172. !d. at 923-24. 
173. !d. at 924. 
174. Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1, at 605, 610 n.33. See generally CLARK, supra note 23, at 
659-62; see supra note 41 (natural grandparents' rights terminated as well). 
175. See Oppel, supra note 1, at 653, discussing decisions by the Nova Scotia County Court Judge 
O'Hearn, who has never failed to waive the natural parent's consent and grant the stepparent adoption. 
In more than fourteen years on the bench, Judge O'Hearn has always considered adoption the best 
resolution; however, he has frequently expressed a wish that the parents would permit the nonadopting 
natural parent access to the child. [d. at 643, 653-54. See also infra note 371. 
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condition of the adoption decree. 176 Professor Bissett-Johnson reports that 
courts have denied adoptions that otherwise would have been granted, because 
of their inability to include visitation for the natural parent in the adoption 
decree. 177 
In only one case has a U.S. court granted a stepparent adoption while allowing 
visitation rights to the natural father. 178 The court concluded that it was in the 
best interests of the stepdaughters to grant them an independent right to visit 
their natural father and appointed a guardian ad litem to enforce their right.179 
This unusual case has not been followed in any other jurisdiction and apparently 
does not establish a precedential change in the general rule against granting 
conditional adoptions. 18o 
176. In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 N.J. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986 (1979); Recent Develop-
ments, Rights of Natural Father After AMption of Children by Stepfather, 4 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 199 (1980). 
See also Williams, supra note I, at 226-27. 
177. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 344. 
178. In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 N.J. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 989 (1979). The children were 
nine and eleven years old and had not lived with or seen their natural father since the divorce, six years 
prior to the adoption request. During the six years, the natural mother had lived in Minnesota and New 
Jersey, and the natural father had remained in Alaska. The court apparently blamed the natural 
mother for hindering the natural father's visitations; the court noted she had moved twice and had not 
given him the new addresses. Because a court had twice conditioned support payments on the exercise 
of his visitation rights, the natural father had not made any support payments. When the adoption 
request was filed, the natural father consented conditionally, but reserved the right to visit his daughters 
after the adoption if they so desired. 
179. Id. at 421, 406 A.2d at 989. 
Based on the testimony of the parties, this court finds that the best interests of the children will 
be promoted by granting unto the two children an independent privilege to visit, at their 
option, and to maintain contact with their natural father. Future litigation will be avoided. 
Accordingly, a guardian ad litem will be appointed by this court whom the children may contact to 
enforce this right, should their natural mother or adoptive father attempt in the future to frustrate their 
attempt to maintain a relationship with their natural father. In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 NJ. 
Super. 419, 421, 406 A.2d 986, 989 (1979). 
180. The court cited cases from New York to support its proposition that visitation orders and 
adoption orders are not incompatible; yet the cases cited do not stand for that proposition. Indeed, one 
of the cases, In re Gerald G.G., 61 A.D.2d 521, 403 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1978), is cited for declaring that "a best 
interest of the child standard would apply to the grant or denial of visitation rights to a natural parent 
subsequent to adoption." 170 N.J. Super. at 421, 405 A.2d at 989. But the Gerald G.G. case actually holds 
that an adoption precludes the granting of visitation rights to the natural father. The New York court 
had denied the adoption precisely because of reluctance to sever the natural parent's relationship. In re 
Gerald G.G., 61 A.D.2d 521, 525, 403 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (1978). The other cases cited in support by the 
New Jersey court deal with the rights of a natural father in blocking the adoption of an illegitimate 
child. Although the cases state that the court does have jurisdiction to decide visitation after adoption, 
neither case actually granted visitation. 
In addition to its questionable use of authority, the New Jersey case creates a remedy of dubious 
value. Granting the girls an independent right, which will be enforced by a guardian ad litem despite 
the opposition of the natural mother and adoptive father, creates a potentially divisive interference with 
the rights of the parents to determine their daughters' associations. If the girls' interests are best served 
by retaining a legal relationship with their natural father, the adoption order was inappropriate. 
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6. Summary of the Current Legal Position of U.S. Stepfamilies 
A stepparent acquires no parental rights or duties by virtue of that status 
alone. Even if an in loco parentis relationship is found to exist, the finding confers 
limited duties and more limited rights on the parties, and it remains unsettled 
when and how the in loco parentis relationship terminates. There is little likeli-
hood that an unadopted stepchild can bear the same surname as the rest of the 
stepfamily. Issues of visitation and custody are generally resolved against the 
stepparent. As the law in the United States now stands, the stepparent who 
cannot or does not want to adopt the stepchildren is in a tenuous and anxious 
position. Only adoption is available to resolve the problems of rights, duties, 
surnames, succession, termination, visitation, and custody for the stepparent, yet 
adoption is a harsh resolution for the nonadoptive natural parent who desires a 
continued relationship with his or her natural child. In England, however, the 
effects of a law drafted intentionally to discourage stepparent adoption, the 
Children Act 1975, and certain other laws combine fortuitously to enhance the 
English stepparent's legal position. 
III. THE ENGLISH ApPROACH TO STEPPARENT ADOPTION 
A. Background 
In 1969 the English Home Department created the Departmental Committee 
on the Adoption of Children (the Houghton Committee) to examine adoption 
law, policy, and procedure, and to recommend desirable changes. '81 The com-
mittee published its recommendations in 1972,'82 and the recommendations 
were enacted in large measure into the 1975 revision of the adoption laws,183 the 
Children Act 1975.184 
181. Statement of purpose, Houghton Report, supra note 15, at ~ I. The Home Department is a 
cabinet-level department, headed by a minister who sits on the cabinet, and a secretary who administers 
the daily operations. This department is responsible for various functions, including advising the 
government on family and domestic legislation. See generally P. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 
132-37 (1979). 
The Houghton Committee is occasionally referred to as the Stockdale Committee, after its second 
chair Judge F.A. Stockdale. The committee comprised members of Parliament, social workers, doctors, 
academics, and judges. On the basis of previous research projects sponsored by the government and the 
collected knowledge of the members, the committee produced a working paper in 1970 and then 
solicited comments both in writing and from witnesses who appeared at forty-eight public hearings. In 
addition, the committee commissioned a series of studies and surveys. The committee's work culmi-
nated in submission of the Houghton Report to the Home Secretary, who in turn presented it to the 
Prime Minister for submission to Parliament. See generally Houghton Report, supra note 15, at ~~ 1-8; 
Bromley, The New English Law of Adoption, in THE CHILD AND THE COURTS 359 (I. Baxter & M. Eberts 
eds. 1978). 
182. Houghton Report, supra note 15. 
183. See supra note 16; see also STONE, supra note 33, at 225-30, for an overview of adoption laws since 
the beginning of the century in England. 
184. Children Act 1975, ch. 72. This act, consolidated with other laws on adoption into the Adoption 
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Of major concern to the Houghton Committee was the dramatic increase in 
adoptions of legitimate children by their own relatives, especially by their natural 
and stepparents.18S Defining adoption as "the complete severance of the legal 
relationship between parents and child and the establishment of a new one 
between the child and his adoptive parents,"186 the committee noted that an 
adoption by a natural and stepparent "severs in law, but not in fact, an existing 
relationship of blood or of affinity, and creates an adoptive relationship in place 
of the natural one which in fact, though not in law, continues unchanged."187 
The main effect of such an adoption is the legal extinction of a legitimate child's 
relationship with one-half of his or her own family, and the concomitant extin-
guishing of the nonadopting natural parent's rights,188 an effect the committee 
felt was "inappropriate and could be damaging."189 
Since stepparent adoption changes little in the step family - the natural parent 
and stepparent are already caring for the child and will continue to do so 
whether or not the stepparent adopts190 - the committee suggested that step-
parent adoptions be sharply curtailed.191 The suggestion mirrored the serious 
misgivings of the English judiciary concerning the use of adoption laws to give 
stepparents parental rights, misgivings expressed in various stepparent adoption 
cases.192 
Act 1976, ch. 36, is not yet wholly in effect. English legislation can be brought into operation piece-by-
piece, as the enabling appropriations are approved. The provisions of the Children Act 1975 that 
establish a national service for matching adoptees with adoptive families have not yet been activated, for 
lack offunds. Bromley, supra note 181, at 364. The consolidated legislation, the Adoption Act 1976, was 
not yet in operation six years after enactment. Samuels, Adoption: The Social, Professional and Legal Trends, 
12 FAM. LAW 186,188 (1982). However, the section discussed in this article, sec. 10(3) of the Children 
Act 1976, is presendy in effect, having received the Royal Assent on january I, 1976. STONE, supra note 
33, at 227. 
185. The Houghton Committee relied on a survey, commissioned by the Home Department, for 
figures on the incidence of adoptions by natural and stepparents of their own children. Stating that in 
1966, 29 percent of all adoptions in Great Britain (7,140 of 24,832) were by parents, generally a natural 
and stepparent applying joindy, the committee reported that the number of such adoptions had 
increased since then, and that this trend was likely to continue. Houghton Report,supra note 15, at~ 97. 
See also id. at ~ 19 and Appendix B, Table 3, for figures. 
186. Id. at ~ 14. 
187. Id. at ~ 97. 
188. See Bissett-johnson, supra note 1, at 336; Hopkins & Benson, supra note 1, at 339. 
189. Houghton Report, supra note 15, at ~ 105. 
190. Id. at ~ 97. See also Bissett-johnson, supra note 1. at 336. Certainly adoption changes the legal 
relationship of the child and the adopting parents. However, these writers are comparing the adoption 
of a legitimate child by its custodial natural parent and stepparent, with the adoption of an orphan or 
illegitimate child by strangers, the so-called "conventional" adoption. See supra notes 54-55; In re S. 
(Infants) (Adoption by parent), 1977 Fam. 173, 178. 
191. In the 1970 working paper published to provoke public comment and input, the Houghton 
Committee suggested that stepparent adoptions of legitimate children be banned entirely. Overwhelm-
ing adverse public response convinced the committee to modify its position. See Hopkins & Benson, 
supra note I, at 339. 
192. E.g.,Re D., 1973 Fam. 209; Re M., 124 NEW. L.J. 566 (1974). See Bissett-johnson,supra note 1, at 
338. 
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The committee instead recommended that guardianship laws should be ex-
tended to stepparents.193 Allowing stepparents to become the legal guardians of 
their spouse's children would confer rights l94 and impose duties l95 on the step-
parent without extinguishing the ties of the noncustodial natural parent (and 
grandparents and other reiatives).196 Furthermore, this arrangement would be 
open to periodic review. 197 
The recommendation became section 1O(3)of the Children Act 1975.198 This 
section requires a court to dismiss the adoption application filed by a natural 
parent and stepparentl99 if the court considers the matter to be more appropri-
193. Houghton Report, supra note 15, Recommendation 20. This recommendation covered other 
relatives, including adoptions by a grandparent, sister, brother, aunt, uncle, or natural father, although 
the report stated that only five percent of the adoptions in 1966 were by such relatives. Id. at ch. 5. 
194. A person has parental rights only if they have been conferred by some legal process. See 
CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 440-43. Parental duties are also imposed by statute.Id. at 436. While certain 
duties have been imposed by statute on English stepparents, e.g., the duty to support a child of the 
family, a stepparent has no parental rights by virtue of that status. In re N., 1974 Fam. 40. The 
guardianship that the Houghton Committee proposed for stepparents would have conferred all those 
parental rights and duties generally conferred on natural parents, including: the right to physical 
possession (custody); the right to determine the child's education; the right to discipline; the right to 
choose a religion; the right to receive the child's domestic services; the right to represent the child in 
legal proceedings; the right to determine medical treatment and consent thereto; the right to access; the 
right to consent to the child's marriage; and the duty to maintain. The committee recommended certain 
other rights, which were subsequently deleted by Parliament, namely the right to control the child's 
property (guardian of the estate powers); the right to consent to the child's adoption; the right to 
change the child's surname; and the right to effect the child's emigration from the United Kingdom. 
CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 437. See generally id. at 427-44; Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 345. 
The parental rights of a natural parent include also the right to transmit the parental rights by 
appointing a testamentary guardian. See supra text accompanying notes 134-136. This right, however, is 
not included in the rights conferred on a stepparent by custodianship, nor is the right to change the 
child's religion. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 438, 525. 
195. Duties that may be required of a legal guardian include the duty to maintain. CRETNEY, supra 
note 28, at 443. See further section III.C.1. 
196. Houghton Report, supra note 15, at ~ 105. 
Although the terms "custody," "custodianship," and "guardianship" are often used interchangeably, 
they have different meanings in the common law, and in the Houghton Report. Custody, in its 
narrowest sense, means the physical care and control of the child. In its broadest sense, it is synonymous 
with guardianship. See CRETNEY,supra note 28, at 430. The Houghton Committee, wishing to confer the 
broadest possible range of parental rights of a natural or adoptive parent, discussed granting guardian-
ships to stepparents and other relatives in lieu of adoptions. See Houghton Report, supra note 15, at 
~~ 106, 1 12, 114. When the committee's recommendations were enacted into the Children Act 1975, the 
terminology was changed to "custodianship." Since a guardian traditionally has certain powers - to 
deal with the ward's property and to consent to the ward's adoption - that Parliament declined to 
confer on nonadopting stepparents and other relatives, Parliament changed the term and diminished 
the powers. Consequently, in the application of the Children Act discussed in this Comment, step-
parents can receive custodianships, which give them joint legal custody oftheir stepchildren and confer all 
the parental duties and rights of a natural parent, except for those rights described above as withheld. 
See generally Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 338; CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 437-40, 525-30. 
197. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 338; CRETNEY, supra note 28, at ~ 131. 
198. Children Act 1975, ch. 72. 
199. 
Adoption by a step-father alone extinguishes his wife's rights and responsibilities. This is why 
applications have to be made jointly in these cases. Some mothers have objected to having to 
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ately dealt with under section 42 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.200 Because 
of the requirement, most stepparent adoption applications are dismissed when 
first brought in any court having jurisdiction over children.201 These courts then 
refer the application to the divorce court that initially iss.ued custody orders to 
the stepparent's spouse.202 The divorce court can modify the custody arrange-
ment and give the stepparent joint custody with the custodial natural parent.203 
The Children Act uses the phrase "better dealt with"204 to describe matters that 
should be dismissed and referred to a divorce court. In applying the statute, the 
court must first determine if the matter can be "dealt with" by a divorce court.205 
No English divorce court has jurisdiction if the stepchild has never been the 
subject of a divorce court order, either because the child's parents were never 
married or because the divorce was granted by a foreign court.206 If the child has 
been the subject of an English order but the order is now vacated, e.g., because 
the other natural parent has died,207 the divorce court has no jurisdiction.208 In 
other words, the divorce court cannot deal with the matter. 
adopt their own children in order to confer rights and responsibilities on the stepfather. In 
future a mother wiII not have to do so because the step-father will be able to apply for 
guardianship. A guardianship order will not extinguish the mother's legal rights and obliga-
tions but will result in her sharing them with her husband. 
Houghton Report, supra note 15, at 11 110. 
200. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ch. IS. This law deals with the dissolution of marriage. Section 42 
empowers the court to make any order regarding a child of the parties, or a child of the family, see infra 
note 2S3 for definition, that the court deems necessary for the welfare of the child. A custody order can 
be made at any time, during or after the divorce proceedings. In this connection, the section is used to 
modify the original custody order by creating joint custody, shared by the stepparent and the natural 
parent who already has custody. 
201. Applications for adoption may be brought, depending on the amount of money the applicant 
can afford to pay in fees, to High Court, county court, or magistrates' court. R.M. JACKSON, THE 
MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 256 n.l (6th ed. 1972). See also, BEVAN Be PARRY, supra note 7S, at 
11 277. Even if the family division court can hear the stepparent's application, because the child has never 
been the subject of another court's order, the Children Act still discourages the granting of a stepparent 
adoption. Section 37 of the act requires that the court consider whether a simple custodianship is more 
beneficial for the child. If so, the adoption application must be treated as if it were a custodianship 
application. CRETNEY, supra note 2S, at 529. 
203. Bissett-johnson, supra note 1, at 33S. 
204. Children Act 1975, ch. 72, sec. 10(3). 
205. The divorce court retains jurisdiction over the custody of any child who was the subject of a 
decree made by that court. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ch. IS, sec. 42; CRETNEY,supra note 2S, at 469. 
The court may make whatever order it sees fit for the custody and education of any minor child of the 
family. [d. Because the stepparent may be compelled to seek a remedy in the court that granted his or 
her spouse's earlier divorce, the Matrimonial Causes Rules 1977, r.92(3), enables the stepparent to 
apply for custody without first receiving leave to intervene as a third party. BEVAN Be PARRY,supra note 
7S, at 11 260, n.2. 
206. [d. at 11 260. See supra note 202. 
207. [d. If the noncustodial natural parent has died, the stepparent can apply to High Court, county 
court, or a magistrates' court for the adoption. However, even in these circumstances, the court is 
directed to determine whether the matter could be better handled by naming the stepparent legal 
guardian, with parental rights fully equal to the surviving natural parent, rather than severing the 
child's relationship with the deceased natural parent's relatives. CRETNEY, supra note 2S, at 541-42. 
20S. Thus, the matter must remain in the High Court, county court, or magistrates' court, where it 
can be dismissed outright, granted with a waiver of the natural parent's consent, granted with the 
consent of both natural parents, or treated as a request for guardianship. See id. at 539-42. 
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If the adoption court determines that a divorce court can hear the matter, the 
court must then consider whether the divorce court should hear it, that is, 
whether the matter is better dealt with in divorce court than in adoption court.209 
The adoption court will grant a stepparent adoption only "if adoption will 
safeguard and promote the welfare of the child better than the existing ar-
rangements and better than any other arrangements that could be made under 
the divorce jurisdiction (such as an order giving joint custody to the mother and 
stepfather)."21o Even if the nonadopting natural parent has consented to the 
adoption, the court cannot grant the request unless the adoption would bring 
greater benefit to the child than maintenance of the status quo or revision of the 
custody order would bring.211 The view of the courts is that a child "being 
brought up in the home of one of his natural parents and a stepparent . . . 
already has the material advantages that adoption can provide, so· that the 
advantages of adoption have to be found, if at all, in the intangible results which 
flow from it."212 
B. Motivations for Stepparent Adoptions 
Although the "emphasis now clearly lies against the making of adoption orders 
in favour of a step-parent,"213 there are cases in which the "intangible results" 
indicate that adoption is the better course. A successful stepparent adoption 
application is likely only when the child is very young at the time of the applica-
tion; has lived very little or not at all with the nonadopting natural parent; does 
not presently have a significant relationship or contact with that parent; and is 
unlikely to come into contact in the future with that parent and with his or her 
relatives.214 By contrast, the unsuccessful stepparent adoption generally involves 
209. The act does not provide much guidance for the court in deciding which course of action is 
preferable. Section 3 suggests: 
In reaching any decision relating to the adoption of a child, a cou rt or adoption agency shall 
have regard for all the circumstances, first consideration being given to the need to safeguard 
and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood; and shall as far as practicable 
ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding the decision and give due consideration 
to them, having regard to his age and understanding. 
Children Act 1975, ch. 72, sec. 3. This section deviates from earlier English law by deliberately omitting 
the standard phrase used in laws since 1925, "the court shall regard the welfare of the child as the first 
and paramount consideration." [emphasis added) The deliberate omission seems to leave room for 
consideration of the rights of the adults involved as well, although the child's welfare is primary. See 
generally Bromley, supra note 181, at 361. See further In re S. (Infants) (Adoption by parents), 1977 Fam. 
173, discussed infra notes 216-27 and accompanying text, for a judicial interpretation of the phrase 
"better dealt with." 
210. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 539-40, discussing the In re S. test. 
211. See In re S., 1977 Fam. at 177. "It is not, therefore, sufficient that adoption would be beneficial to 
the child; it has to be shown that it will be better than the alternatives." CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 540. 
212. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 540, (paraphrasing In re S., 3 All E.R. at 675). 
213. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 540. 
214. Hopkins & Benson, supra note 1, at 341 (paraphrasing Lord Ormrod's opinion in In re S.); see 
generally In re S. (Infants) (Adoption by parents), 1977 Fam. 173. 
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a legitimate child who has lived with the nonadopting natural parent; has even a 
minimal relationship with that parent; will be remaining in the same physical 
environment whether the stepparent adoption is granted or not; and, as a 
member of the stepfamily, already has all the material advantages that adoption 
would bring.215 
The leading case of In re S.216 illustrates these factors, in a dismissal of a 
stepparent adoption application. The divorced mother of three boys, ages six to 
eleven, and her husband of three months applied for adoption orders.217 Her 
previous marriage had ended two-and-a-half years earlier. The mother had 
received custody, and the natural father regular visitation privileges (or access, as 
the English call it) and a weekly support requirement. Although he lived only a 
few miles away, the father rarely exercised his access rights, seeing the boys once 
in the summer of 1975 and not requesting another visit until March 1976.218 
In March 1976, the mother married a man whom she had been dating for two 
years. "It was said that the relationship [between the stepfather and the three 
boys] was a close one; they were pleased to accept him as a father and he, as the 
[lower court] judge put it, 'regards them as his sons.' "219 Although the natural 
father consented to the adoption, the lower court dismissed the application in 
accord with section 10(3) of the Children Act 1975.220 
The applicants appealed, saying that the adoption would be in the children's 
best interest, that the natural father and the boys had consented, and that the 
natural father had no feelings for the boys, not having seen them or supported 
them for over a year.221 In addition, they contended, the judge had erred in 
reasoning that it would be advantageous for the boys to retain a legal link to their 
natural father, so that they could someday re-establish a relationship with him.222 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal223 and stated: 
215. Hopkins & Benson, supra note I, at 341. 
216. In re S. (Infants) (Adopl'ion by parents), 1977 Fam. 173. 
217.ld. at 173. 
218. Id. at 175. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 174. 
221. Id. at 175. 
222. [d. at 174. 
223. One of the points on appeal was that section 10(3) did not apply in this case since the original 
county court hearing had occurred five months before the effective date of section 10(3), see supra note 
184. In addition, the natural parents had been divorced in Edinburgh, Scotland, and the section was 
applicable only to divorces granted in England and Wales. (The legislation subsequently was extended 
to cover Scotland as well.) The lower court judge, while acknowledging that he was not bound by section 
10(3), nonetheless applied the philosophy behind it in reaching his decision. The Court of Appeal held 
that this was within his discretion and upheld his interpretation of the section. Id. at 177-78. 
Because no English divorce court had jurisdiction in this case, the county court was able to entertain 
the adoption application. Having determined that adoption was not appropriate, the county court could 
and did make a joint custody order in favor of the natural mother and the stepfather. The couple 
appealed the county court's refusal to grant the adoption. Id. 
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[T]he advantages of adoption [in this kind of case] are vague and 
uncertain. It was suggested that the children would feel more secure 
if they were adopted, and wanted to "belong" to [the stepfather]. 
They had said they wanted to be adopted, and, like so many chil-
dren, wanted to be known by the same surname as their mother and 
stepfather. The judge rightly took into account, but largely dis-
counted, the children's views because they were too young to be able 
to understand the true effects of adoption. He did not think that 
adoption would increase their sense of security or make them feel 
more "integrated" into the new family unit.224 
497 
The Court of Appeal therefore upheld the lower court's denial of the adoption, 
leaving the stepfather as joint custodian of the boys and the natural father still 
linked legally to his sons.225 Warning the lower courts to investigate this kind of 
case with extreme care,226 the Court of Appeal added, "Sometimes, it is the 
step-parent who feels the need to be integrated into the family and who may be 
helped by an adoption order. He or she, after all, is always the late-comer."227 
The question the court must ask is whether and to what extent the adoption 
will safeguard and promote the welfare of the child.228 The court must compare 
the child's position after adoption with the child's position under the existing 
arrangements and under a joint custody arrangement, while bearing in mind 
that the situation at bar is the reverse of the conventional adoption.229 "In the 
normal class of adoption where the adopters are strangers and the child is a small 
baby, and usually illegitimate, the answer ... , once the adopters are shown to be 
suitable parents, is so obvious that it is taken for granted and the question 
scarcely even asked."230 But in the case of a stepparent adoption, the adoption 
must do more than safeguard and promote the child's welfare; it must do so 
better than any other possible arrangement, or it must be denied. 
A recent case, In re D. (Minors) ,231 illustrates the rare successful adoption 
224. Id. at 178. 
225. /d. 
226. Id. at 178-79. Because a court must now choose between granting an adoption, maintaining the 
status quo, or awarding joint custody, considerably more investigation is required in these cases than in 
a conventional adoption, where a satisfactory report from the guardian ad litem is usually sufficient. 
The court suggested that judges hear evidence from the other natural parent, even if he or she has 
consented, and that a detailed examination of the proposed adopters' motives be made, perhaps by 
having the guardian ad litem conduct a cross-examination in court. The Court of Appeal also charged 
guardians ad litem with the responsibility of delineating the disadvantages as well as the advantages of 
the proposed adoption. /d. 
227. Id. at 179. 
228. Id. at 177. 
229. /d. 
230. Id. 
231. In re D. (Minors) (Adoption by Step-parent), 2 F.L.R. 102 (Ct. App. 1980) Appeal heard on 
June 12, 1980, by the Court of Appeal, from ajudgment by Watford County Court on April 14, 1980. 
The case is available in the United States on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file. The court refers to the 
parents only as the D. parents and to the children as M. and S. 
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application of a natural parent and stepparent. The Court of Appeal reversed 
the lower court and granted the application to Mr. and Mrs. Dyer. Mrs. Dyer had 
had custody of Michelle, age 13, and Simone, age 11, since her divorce in 1973. 
Sporadic contact with the natural father continued until Christmas 1977, when 
Michelle refused further visitation; Simone ended her contact with him in 
September 1978, although he continued to send the weekly support money. Mr. 
and Mrs. Dyer married in 1976232 and, at the time of the adoption request, 
wanted to emigrate to Australia. In view of the proposed emigration, the adults 
felt it desirable for Mr. Dyer to adopt the girls. Despite the consent of the natural 
father and of the two girls, the lower court refused to grant the adoption, seeing 
no advantage to adoption over a change to joint custody. The court added that 
since the girls clearly remembered their natural father, an adoption would be a 
futile attempt to "rewrite history."233 The adoption, said the lower court, was 
more for Mr. Dyer's benefit, to enhance his sense of paternal authority.234 
In overturning the lower court, the Court of Appeal described four factors 
that distinguished the case and supported the granting ofthe adoption. First, the 
girls' surname had been changed legally to Dyer in September 1976, with the 
consent of the natural father. 235 Second, the girls on their own initiative had 
begun calling Mr. Dyer "Dad" and their natural father "Uncle Jim" .236 Third, the 
court found that they were old enough to understand the meaning and implica-
tions of adoption, that they were freely consenting, and that they greatly desired 
the adoption, to unite the family and give Mr. Dyer a legal standing.237 The court 
noted finally that the family intended to move to Australia and that the girls had 
had, and would have, no contact with the natural paternal grandparents or other 
paternal relatives. 238 
232. Mr. Dyer had been married previously also, and the new family unit included Mr. Dyer's 
children, ages 10 and 13, from the earlier marriage. Mr. Dyer had had custody of his children since his 
divorce in 1973, but their natural mother had not seen or contacted her children since the divorce, and 
her present whereabouts were unknown. Although the Dyers did not feel it was necessary for the 
current Mrs. Dyer to adopt her stepchildren, the lower court judge and the guardian ad litem were 
concerned that the adoption of only two of the four children in the family would disturb the balance of 
the family unit. The Dyers, saying that the natural mother had disappeared completely, felt that the 
second adoption was unnecessary. The Court of Appeal deferred to the Dyers' assessment on this point. 
Id. 
233. Id. at II (LEXIS format). 
234. !d. 
235. Mrs. Dyer's original custody papers had been issued by a magistrates' court, rather than by a 
divorce court, under the magistrates' court's jurisdiction over domestic separations. Since the children 
thus were not subjects of an order issued under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, no restriction barred 
them from changing their surname. A restriction does bar the custodial parent who received custody 
in or following a divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. (It is thus rare for the stepchildren in 
a stepparent adoption case to bear their stepparent's surname already.) See Bissett-Johnson, supra note 
1, at 348. 
236. In re D., at 4 and 8 (LEXIS format). 
237. !d. at 8 (LEXIS format). 
238. !d. 
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Lord Justice Ormrod held that these factors distinguished the case from other 
stepparent adoption cases.239 Noting that the natural father had dropped out of 
the girls' lives both physically and psychologically, the Lord Justice stated: "It is 
reasonable to infer that the children see themselves as members of the Dyer 
family to a much, much greater extent than children of divorced parents nor-
mally do."240 Finding that adoption would clarify the family's legal position in 
Australia, the court held that for this family, adoption was more beneficial than a 
joint custody arrangement.241 That the girls remembered their natural father, a 
fact the lower court judge had found critical, was not "in itself a reason for not 
making an adoption order"242 when the other factors weighed so heavily in favor 
of adoption. 
In comparing Lord Justice Ormrod's application of the factors to the success-
ful Dyer application and the unsuccessful S. application,243 the crucial factor is the 
likelihood of future contact between the children and the nonadopting natural 
parent. Both the Dyer girls and the S. boys remembered their natural fathers. 
Both sets of children had consented to the adoptions, although the Dyer judge 
accepted the consent and the S. judge rejected it.244 The S. boys ranged in age 
from three to eight at the time of their parents' divorce; the Dyer girls were three 
and six at their parents' divorce. In both cases, contact with the nonadopting 
natural parent had ceased, although the party initiating the cessation differed: 
the children in the Dyer family, the adults in the S. family.245 
The two major differences between the cases are the length of time the mother 
had been remarried - three months for Mrs. S., four years for Mrs. Dyer- and 
the likelihood that the children would come into contact with the natural father 
- highly probable for the S. boys, who lived a few miles away, highly improbable 
for the Dyer girls, who were moving to Australia. One can infer that the contact 
factor was more critical to the holding from the reference to the proposed move 
in Dyer246 and the absence of any discussion of the length of the new marriages. 
The other leading case in which the court held that the matter was not better 
dealt with by denial of the adoption is In re D. (An infant) .247 The parents married 
239. Id. at 7 (LEXIS format). 
240. /d. at 7-8 (LEXIS format). 
241. Id. at 13 (LEXIS format). 
242. Id. at 8 (LEXIS format). 
243. See supra notes 216-30 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra text accompanying note 224. 
245. The Dyer girls, apparently on their own initiative, ended contact with their natural father. In re 
D., at 2 (LEXIS format). Mrs. R., the natural mother, refused to allow the natural father to visit the S. 
boys the last time he requested access. This request came in the month in which she was scheduled to 
remarry. Once denied, Mr. S. did not ask to see the boys again. In re S., 1977 Fam. at 175. 
246. See In re D., at 8 (LEXIS format). 
247. In re D. (An infant) (Adoption: Parent's Consent) (1976)3 W.L.R. 12, (1977) A.C. 602 (C.A.), 
rev'd, [1977)2 W.L.R. 79, [1977) A.C. 617 (H.L.). See, e.g., 126 NEW L.J. 265 (1976); Samuels,supra note 
184, at 187; for discussions of this case. 
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in 1966 and separated in 1967, shortly after the birth of their son.248 In 1971 the 
mother obtained an uncontested divorce alleging cruelty; the major allegation 
was that the father was a practicing homosexual. The mother received custody of 
the child, and the father was granted reasonable access. In 1972 the mother 
unilaterally changed the boy's surname to that of the man with whom she was 
living and whom she married two years later. During the six years preceding this 
marriage, the natural father visited the boy occasionally at the mother's home, 
but the boy did not realize that this visitor was his natural father. 249 
The mother and stepfather applied for a stepparent adoption in 1975 and 
asked that the natural father's consent be waived because he had failed to 
maintain the child and was a practicing homosexual.25o The court granted the 
adoption, waiving the consent of the father on the ground that he was acting 
unreasonably in withholding it.251 
The Court of Appeal reversed252 and was in turn reversed by the House of 
Lords,253 which reinstated the adoption decree. Although the House of Lords 
upheld the trial court on discretionary grounds,254 the opinion affirmed the trial 
court's reasoning that continued access by the natural father was not in the best 
interests of the boy, and that the advantages of adoption outweighed the net 
benefit to the boy of retaining an unbroken legal link with the natural father. 255 
The outcome in this case meets the test for predicting a successful stepparent 
adoption case,256 even if one excludes the factor of the father's sexual prefer-
ence. The boy was young at the time of the application (seven years old), had 
lived with the natural father only a few months when an infant, did not have a 
significant relationship presently with the natural father - indeed, he did not 
even realize that this man was his father - and was unlikely to come into contact 
in the future with the father or his relatives. For these reasons, the court granted 
the adoption, and the House of Lords affirmed. 
Although the case is unusual, it is not unique: stepparent adoptions did not 
248. In re D., [1976] 2 All E.R. at 342. 
249. Id. 
250. /d. 
251. Id. at 342-43. 
252. Id. at 346-47 (C.A.). 
253. In re D., [1977] I All E.R. 145, 146 (H.L.). 
254. 
Since the judge had applied the right test to the facts which he had found, his conclusion that 
the father's consent was unreasonably withheld could not be disturbed. In any event ... since 
appeals from the county court on questions of fact in respect of the making or refusing of 
adoption orders did not lie to the Court of Appeal and since the county court judge had not 
misdirected himself in law the Court of Appeal was not competent to entertain the appeal and 
ought to have dismissed it. 
Id. at 146. 
255. Id. The Court of Appeal had suggested that concern over the boy's exposure to homosexuality 
could be quelled by controlling the access of the natural father, for example, by restricting visits to take 
place only at the paternal grandparents' home. In re D., [1976] 2 All E.R. at 346. 
256. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. 
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end entirely following the passage of the Children Act 1975.257 Instead, the 
emphasis has changed. The contemporary thinking in England, stemming from 
the Houghton Report258 and the Children Act, is that "adoption is not desirable 
if it would effectively sever a real link between a child and a parent, e.g., a 
non-custodial father, and custody in one form or another, which is always subject 
to review and change, is preferable to the finality of adoption."259 Although "[i]t 
was originally thought that parental or step-parental adoption would become 
virtually extinct"260 under the Children Act, this has not occurred. In 1980, of 
the 10,600 adoptions in England, 3,700 - 34.9 percent - were adoptions of 
legitimate children by their natural and stepparents.261 
"[T]hejudicial policy is clearly not to reject [stepparent] adoption to the same 
extent as it had been assumed that Parliament and the statute required or 
expected."262 Emphasis is on careful investigation, comparing custody arrange-
ments and the requested adoption, to ascertain the more appropriate mea-
sure.263 Unconditional orders are desirable for the stepparent adoptions that are 
granted, with access generally considered incompatible with adoption.264 Courts 
try to discourage the "artificial" adoption.265 
The statute does not prohibit adoption. It discourages the "artificial" 
adoption, e.g., the natural father has had considerable contact with 
the child and the child knows that the step-father is a step-father. It 
does not prohibit the "natural" adoption, e.g., the natural father has 
had no contact with the child since babyhood and the child looks 
upon his step-father as his real father.266 
The D. case discussed above illustrates a natural adoption. 
Although the policy against permissive granting of adoption to stepparents is 
clear,267 Lord Justice Ormrod warns that the "procedure in these stepparent 
adoption cases has still not been fully worked out in my view and it is very 
difficult for the judge, where he has to exercise a statutory jurisdiction, which 
257. Samuels, supra note 184, at 186. 
258. Bissett-johnson mentions cases, some of which predate the Houghton Report, in which the 
English judiciary expressed misgivings about the granting of stepparent adoptions. He is not sure 
whether these misgivings were influenced by the Houghton Committee's work or were developed 
independently. Bissett-johnson,supra note I, at 338,339. The committee, rather than instigating a new 
attitude, may have reflected a trend already extant. 
259. Samuels, supra note 184, at 186. 
260. [d. at 187. 
261. [d. at 186. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text for comparison figures. 
262. /d. at 187. 
263. [d. at 188. 
264. "An order subject to conditions [such as access for relatives after adoption] is inherently 
undesirable. Either make an unconditional order or do not make one at all." [d. 
265. [d. at 187. 
266. [d. 
267. See generally CUTNEY,supra note 28, at 539; Bissett-johnson,supra note 1, at 339; Bromley,supra 
note 181, at 375; Hopkins &: Benson, supra note 1, at 340. 
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may very well involve his refusing an application which is unilaterally made and 
not opposed,"268 Even in a case in which all the adults and children consent, 
and all seem to be giving an informed consent, adoption will not be granted as a 
matter of right,269 unless the judge is convinced that the advantages of adoption 
- a statutory "guillotine"270 - outweigh the advantages of the existing arrange-
ments or a modification that gives the stepparent joint custody with the custodial 
natural parent.271 
But the concerns that motivate stepparents to pursue adoption of their step-
children272 reflect issues more extensive than the question of physical control. 
The English laws help the English stepparent who can not or does not adopt, in 
each of the areas of concern discussed above, far more than the U,S, laws help 
the U,S, stepparent. What does the English stepparent accomplish by a grant of 
joint custody, that a stepparent in the United States cannot accomplish with an in 
loco parentis relationship? 
C, Areas of Concern 
1, Parental Rights and Duties 
The English divorce court, in arranging joint custody, can vest the stepparent 
with all the rights and duties vested in a natural parent except the right to change 
the child's surname unilaterally,273 the right to arrange and effect the child's 
emigration,274 and the right to consent to the child's adoption,275 English scholars 
reason further that a stepparent with custody cannot appoint a testamentary 
guardian,276 although this prohibition is not stated explicitly in any law,277 In 
268, Re C. and C. (infants), No. 80 01797 (Transcript: Association) (G.A. hearing date June 8,1981) 
(available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file), at 9 (LEX IS format). 
269. See, e.g. ,In re S., (Infants) (Adoption by parents), 1977 Fam. 173; Hopkins & Benson, supra note 
I, at 341. 
270. Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce said, in a concurring opinion, that 
while it is strongly in the child's interest that he should be settled in the family life of the 
mother and her second husband, it is "quite wrong to use. the adoption law to extinguish the 
relationship between the protesting father and the child, unless there is some really serious 
factor which justifies the use of the statutory guillotine. The courts should not encourage the 
idea that after divorce the children of the family can be reshuffled and dealt out like a pack of 
cards in a second rubber of bridge." 
Khan, Adoption by Parent and Step-parent, 8 FAM. LAw 146, 147 (1978) (quoting Re B. (a minor), [1975] 2 
W.L.R. 569). 
271. See Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 338. 
272. See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text. Cj. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 336-37. 
273. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 345. 
274. BEVAN & PARRY, supra note 78, at 11 231. 
275. [d. at 11 233. 
276. [d. at 11 234. Since a custodian has only those rights that relate to the person of the child, id. at 
~I 233, and since a testamentary appointment vests all the parental rights and duties in the testamentary 
guardian, it follows that the custodian cannot pass on more rights than he possesses (nemo dat quod non 
habet). [d. at 1111 233-34. See also CRETNEY, supra note 1, at 436-37. 
277. BEVAN & PARRY, supra note 78, at 11 234. 
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modifying the original custody decree, the court can also modify any arrange-
ments previously made for access by the noncustodial natural parent or for 
support required from any party.278 
A stepparent without custodian or guardian status conferred by a court has no 
rights at all.279 "In certain circumstances stepfathers, as well as other custodians 
of minor children, acquire certain liabilities at common law and a great many 
more liabilities by statute, but that is not because they are stepfathers; that is 
because they are adults having de facto control of children."280 Even the "rights 
and obligations which are acquired by stepfathers who take the necessary steps, or 
adopt the necessary attitude, to make minor children of their wives by previous 
marriages children of the family"281 are rights and duties conferred by statute 
and not by virtue of status. 
One statutory liability that can be imposed on a stepparent, with or without 
joint custody of the stepchild, is the duty to support.282 Under the Domestic 
Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978, either party to a marriage may 
petition a magistrates' court for an order compelling the other party to support 
the petitioner or any "child of the family."283 If the child to be supported is a 
child of the family but not the child of the respondent party, e.g., a stepchild, the 
court can consider, among all other circumstances in the case, whether the 
respondent has been supporting the child to date and with knowledge that the 
child was not the respondent's offspring.284 Orders made under this statute285 
continue, regardless of whether the parties divorce, until the death of either 
party to the marriage,286 until the child reaches majority, or until the remarriage 
of the petitioner.287 Either party can request action under the statute whenever 
278. See generally CRETNEY, supra note I, at 529-30; STONE, ,upra note 33, at 199-203. 
279. In re N .• 1974 Fam. 40. 
280. 1974 Fam at 42. 
281. /d. (emphasis added). 
282. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 337. 
283. Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978, ch. 22, sec. I. "Child of the family" 
refers to any child of both the parties to a marriage and to any other child, save a foster child placed by a 
licensed or state agency (such agency being in loco parentis), who has been treated by both of the parties 
as a member of the family. This definition is found in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ch. 18, sec. 
52(1), and the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978, ch. 22, sec. 88(1). It is intended 
to be extremely broad in coverage, CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 467-68, and to include all children of both 
parties, whether legitimate, illegitimate, legitimated, or adopted; and it includes those children who 
have been treated as members of the family, such as stepchildren. Id. 
284. Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978, ch. 22, sec. 3(3). 
285. Orders made by a divorce court under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 for custody and other 
arrangements can be made either in the divorce decree or before or after it. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 
469. If the parties do not complete the divorce, orders can still be made within a reasonable amount of 
time after the dismissal of the suit. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 469 (citing Matrimonial Causes Act 1973), 
ch. 18, sec. 42(1)). Orders regarding a child of the family made under the Domestic Proceedings and 
Magistrates' Courts Act can be made at any time during a marriage and are not dependent on the 
initiation of a divorce suit. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 483-84. 
286. Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978, ch. 22, sec. 4(a). 
287. [d. at sec. 4(b). 
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the other party fails to provide reasonable maintenance for the applicant or for 
any child of the family.288 The statute is not limited to use in marital proceedings, 
although it was enacted for use primarily during separations due to domestic 
violence.289 
The fact that a child is a "child of the family" does not guarantee that a spouse 
who is neither the natural nor the adoptive parent of the child will be compelled 
to assume the child's complete support.290 Statutes ensure that the court can 
assign support obligations equitably.291 Thus, no one can be "tricked into a short 
marriage solely in an attempt to foist on him liability" for someone else's child;292 
faced with such an inequity, the court would decline to order support.293 
Since the magistrates' court can order any party to a marriage to support the 
children of the family, even a stepparent without legal custody can be required to 
support a stepchild.294 Should the stepparent seek joint custody, an order for 
support, modified by any support required from the noncustodial natural par-
ent, can be incorporated into the new custody decree in the divorce court.295 In 
both instances, the support order will survive the dissolution of the natural and 
stepparents' marriage, 296 thereby ensuring the stepchild's support. 
2. Succession Rights 
In the United States and England, "[w]hile the court is able to exercise some 
discretion in deciding if a stepchild is to be included in a certain devise, the law of 
intestacy is wholly statutory."297 An English statute, the Inheritance (Provision 
for Family and Dependants) Act 1975,298 gives the English courts considerable 
288. [d. at sec. I. 
289. The matrimonial jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts originated in Parliament's desire to 
provide an accessible forum for battered wives from the poorer classes. CRETNEY,SUpra note 28, at 197. 
The act states that orders expire if parties who were separated at the time of the application begin living 
together again. Orders for financial support of a minor, however, do not expire automatically, even if 
separated parties resume living together. [d. at 488. 
290. Both the divorce court, under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and the magistrates' court, 
under the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 1978, have equitable latitude to adjust 
obligations fairly. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 468 and 487. 
291. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, sec. 25(3), as amended by Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' 
Court Act 1978, sec. 63; Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978, secs. 3(3), 11(5). 
These provisions direct the court to consider, among other circumstances of the case, three factors 
when deciding whether to order financial provision for a child of the family who is not a child of the 
parties, namely: the basis, extent, and length of time a party has assumed responsibility for a child's 
maintenance; whether the party did so with the knowledge that the child was not his or her own 
offspring; and the liability of any other person for the maintenance of the child. See also CRETNEY, supra 
note 28, at 468 and 487. 
292. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 468. 
293. /d. 
294. Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 337. 
295. /d. at 338. 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 285-87. 
297. Berkowitz, supra note 75, at 224 (inheritance not a vested right; granted by the legislature). 
298. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, ch. 63. 
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latitude to deal equitably with intestate problems. Under this act, dependents 
may apply to the court for a share of the deceased supporter's estate.299 If the 
court is satisfied that, "looked at objectively, the disposition of his estate is 
unreasonable,"30o the court can order relief. The relief can be ordered whether 
the will itself or the laws governing intestate distribution, or both, caused the 
petitioning dependent to receive an unreasonable share.30t 
Those who may apply for relief include the spouse of the deceased, any 
former spouse who has not remarried, a child of the deceased (including an 
adopted child) of any age or marital status, and "any person (not being a child of 
the deceased) who, in the case of any marriage to which the deceased was at any 
time a party, was treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation to 
that marriage."302 Any person not included in these clauses, who was wholly or 
partially supported by the deceased at the time of death, e.g., a mistress or live-in 
relative, is also an eligible applicant.303 
The court must be satisfied that under the will as it stands, or under the 
intestate law, or both, no reasonable financial provision has been made for the 
applicant.304 In the case of a stepchild, the court can order the estate to maintain 
the child until majority, but cannot order the estate to give the child capital.305 
Although the maintenance expires at majority, the court must consider in these 
cases the manner in which the stepchild was being or expected to be educated, 
and make provision accordingly.306 
The act is applied generally when the deceased has excluded the applicant 
entirely or has made a token bequest while giving a relatively large amount to a 
mistress or to charity.307 It can also be used, however, when the testator has tried 
to provide for the applicant in a will, but the devise or bequest has failed, or 
when the deceased has died intestate.30B Thus the act is applicable when a 
stepparent has not provided for a stepchild, has died intestate, or has tried to 
provide but has failed to do so under strict rules of construction.309 
Although the Inheritance Act does give the court considerable latitude to 
299. CRETNEY. supra note 28, at 261-62. 
300. [d. 
301. [d. 
302. Inheritance Act 1975, sec. 1(1). 
303. [d. at § 1(1)(d); CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 263. 
304. Inheritance Act 1975, sec. 2(1). 
305. See CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 267-68. 
306. Inheritance Act 1975, sec. 3(3); CRETNEY,supra note 28, at 266-67. Section 3 of the act lists other 
circumstances the court should consider in determining whether and how to exercise its powers. These 
circumstances include the criteria discussed in note 291, supra, as well as the financial needs and 
resources of the applicant. the named beneficiaries and other applicants, and the size of the estate. 
307. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 264-65. 
308. !d. at 265. 
309. See, e.g., CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 264-65. 
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distribute family assets on a discretionary basis,3lO the guiding principle con-
tinues to be that "an Englishman remains at liberty to dispose of his property in 
whatever way he chooses."311 Nevertheless, the act does offer stepchildren better 
protection after the death of a supporting stepparent than they had before its 
enactment.312 
3. Surnames 
The Houghton Committee did not see the question of multiple surnames on 
the mailbox as a difficult problem to resolve.313 The committee thought that 
stepparents could simply obtain a legal change of name, rather than adopt the 
stepchildren to unify the family surname.314 The Court of Appeal, in one line of 
cases, dismissed the problem as one "of little moment and formalistic."315 Both 
bodies, however, were underestimating the emotional intensity of the issue.316 
Maddox quotes a stepfather with a distinguished family name: 
How do other stepparents feel about a strange child taking their 
name? Hejust uses my name. He wants it. He won't change his other 
name legally, and there are all sorts of embarrassments with 
passports and things. But my family name, well, I suppose I'm 
ridiculous, but it's an old [local] name and I resent him using it.317 
Maddox adds, "This man did not object to the fact that the boy, who had lived 
with him since infancy, called him Daddy."318 
Parliament was sufficiently concerned to amend the Matrimonial Causes 
Rules319 by forbidding the custodial parent to change a child's surname without 
the consent of the other natural parent or the hard-to-obtain leave of a court to 
dispense with consent.320 Indeed, "[s]ince early in 1975, slips reminding parents 
of this have generally been appended to or included in custody orders."321 
3 10. [d. at 268. 
311. [d. at 259. 
312. See STONE, supra note 33, at 148-51, 162 (1977). 
313. Bissett-Johnson, supra note 1, at 348. 
314. Houghton Report, supra note 15, at 11 106. 
315. See Glover, Changing a Child's Surname, 128 NEW L.J. 1240, 1241 (1978), and cases discussed 
therein. However, another line of cases described the issue as a "matter of importance." [d. 
316. 
A marriage could be dissolved but not parenthood. The parents in most cases continued to 
play an important role in their children's emotional lives and development. From the point of 
view of the children's best interests it was essential that the parents' feelings should be taken 
very carefully, and anxiously into consideration. 
W. v. A. (child: surname), [1981]1 All E.R. 100 (C.A.). In this case, the mother and stepfather wished to 
emigrate to Australia. The natural father consented to the move on the condition that the children 
retain his surname. The mother's appeal from a judgment in the father's favor was unsuccessful. 
317. MADDOX, supra note 1, at 41-42. 
318. [d. at 42. 
319. Matrimonial Causes Rule 92, Stat. 1nst. 2168 (1974). 
320. Bissett-Johnson, supra note 1, at 348. 
321. !d. 
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Unlike the other areas of concern to a step family, concerns that might moti-
vate a stepparent to pursue adoption if the law provided no alternative, this area 
has not been reformed by English innovations. No intermediate resolution is 
available in English law; only adoption will allow the stepfamily to use a single 
surname, despite the common law, which gives individuals the right to choose 
any surname absent intent to defraud.322 
4. Duration and Termination of the Steprelationship 
Unlike the U.S. step family, the English stepfamily need not end with the death 
of the custodial natural parent. If the natural parent and stepparent sought and 
received joint custody while the natural parent was alive, the stepparent con-
tinues as surviving custodian if the custodial natural parent dies while the 
stepchildren are minors.323 This arrangement continues automatically unless and 
until the surviving natural parent intervenes.324 In the resulting court hearing, 
the claims of the custodial stepparent and the noncustodial natural parent would 
be weighed against the welfare of the children.325 
English law strengthens a stepparent's position in another way: the stepparent 
can be named as a testamentary guardian by the natural parent.326 Either natural 
parent may appoint, by deed or will, any person to serve as guardian of the 
minor children after that parent's death.327 Unlike U.S. law on testamentary 
guardians,328 the appointment is valid even if there is a surviving natural par-
ent.329 Absent objection by the surviving natural parent, the guardian serves 
jointly with that surviving parent.330 
If the surviving natural parent or the testamentary guardian (in this case, the 
stepparent) does object, the court can either order the joint guardianship to 
continue, order exclusive authority for the testamentary guardian, or refuse to 
accept the testamentary appointment, thus leaving the surviving natural parent 
with exclusive parental rights.331 In the absence of a will or deed, the court has 
322. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
323. See CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 436. On the death of a person who is entitled to exercise parental 
rights jointly, such as a natural parent with custody, the rights and duties accrue to the survivor. The 
stepparent, as one of the persons jointly exercising custodial rights and duties, continues as custodian. 
The noncustodial surviving parent still exercises certain rights and duties, which are possessed by the 
noncustodial parent even while the custodial parent is alive. These rights and duties include the duty to 
maintain, the right to access, the right to consent to adoption, and the right to arrange the child's 
emigration. The latter two rights are reserved for natural parents, regardless of custody, and guardians 
only. See supra notes 196, 198, & 276. 
324. See CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 436. 
325. [d. 
326. See CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 441. 
327. [d. 
328. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36. 
329. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 441. 
330. /d. This matter is governed by the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, ch. 3. 
331. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 441; Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, ch. 3, sec. 4(4). 
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discretionary power to appoint a guardian and to exclude the surviving natural 
parent.332 A joint-custodial stepparent in England whose spouse dies thus can 
continue to have custody of the stepchildren; if a testamentary appointment was 
made, either by will or deed, the stepparent's position is further strengthened. 
Assuming the stepparent is fit and the members of the stepfamily so prefer, the 
step family is likely to survive the death of the custodial natural parent.333 
If the stepparent and natural parent divorce, English courts have the power to 
provide for the future care of any child of the family,334 including stepchil-
dren.335 No finding of in loco parentis is needed; no question arises of whether 
divorce terminates the in loco parentis duties.!J36 Instead, support by the steppar-
ent is presumed unless circumstances indicate such support is inequitable.!m 
5. Access 
Whether or not the stepparent has received joint custody of the minor step-
children, the English courts dealing with domestic matters338 have power to 
order access to any minor child of the family;339 the order can be made at any 
time before, during, or after divorce proceedings.34o The right to access can be 
granted to the parent of the child in question, or to either party of the dissolving 
marriage, whether a natural parent or a stepparent.341 The paramount consid-
eration is the welfare of the child, rather than whether a stepparent is entitled to 
visitation.342 
6. Summary of the Current Legal Position of the English Stepfamily 
Unlike the stepparent in the United States, the English stepparent is not 
compelled to adopt the stepchildren as the only means of acquiring strong 
parental rights and duties. The stepparent is discouraged, rather than com-
pelled, from using the adoption laws for this purpose. Instead, the stepparent is 
332. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 442. 
333. Compare this to the situation in Collins v. Gilbreath, discussed fully supra at notes 126 and 151, in 
which the stepfather and stepchildren were separated when custody reverted to the natural father ten 
days after the suicide of the natural mother. 
334. Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 1978, ch. 22, sec. 1; Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973, ch. 18, sec. 27(1), as amended by Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act, sec. 63(1); see 
supra note 283 for the definition of "child of the family." 
335. See supra text accompanying note 294. 
336. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra notes 290-293 and accompanying text. 
338. The High Court, any county court, and the magistrates' courts have jurisdiction over domestic 
matters. STONE, supra note 33, at 137-39. 
339. See CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 475-77. 
340. Matrimonial Causes Act, sec. 42(l)(a); CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 475. 
341. Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 1978, sec. 8(2); CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 
484. 
342. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 491-99. Compare with text accompanying notes 149-51 supra. 
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encouraged to apply for joint custody, which will confer the strongest bundle of 
rights available to the stepparent. 
In addition, English law protects the stepchild at the termination, by death or 
divorce, of the marriage of the stepparent and natural parent. If the marriage 
ends with the death of the stepparent, the stepchild can apply for maintenance 
from the stepparent's estate under the Inheritance Act 1975. If the custodial 
natural parent has died, the stepchild is able to remain with the stepparent if that 
is desired, because the stepparent is the surviving custodian or because the 
stepparent is the testamentary guardian. If the marriage has ended in divorce, 
the stepchild's welfare is protected because the court can require support from 
the stepparent and can permit access. 
Like the U.S. stepparent, the English stepparent cannot change the stepchild's 
surname without the consent of the noncustodial natural parent and the court. 
Without consent, the only other way to acquire a uniform family surname is to 
adopt. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE STEPPARENT'S POSITION IN ENGLAND 
AND THE UNITED STATES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
A. The Legal Positions 
English stepparents and U.S. stepparents have the same three options avail-
able after their marriage to a person with children. They can simply be a 
stepparent; they can seek modification of the natural parent's custody order and 
be a joint custodial stepparent; or they can pursue adoption and become an 
adoptive parent. The consequences of adoption are the same in the two coun-
tries: adoption completely severs the child's legal relationship with the nonadopt-
ing natural parent and relatives, while it establishes a legal parental relationship 
between the child and the adoptive stepparent.343 The stepparent becomes a 
natural parent in the eyes of the law, and the nonadopting natural parent 
becomes a stranger.344 
But the consequences of basic stepparenthood are not the same in the two 
countries. In the United States, the basic stepparent - a person who does 
nothing to create a legal status other than marry someone with children -
acquires no parental rights whatsoever, although he or she may incur a limited 
duty to support.345 Succession is unaltered by basic stepparenthood,346 and a 
343. Houghton Report, supra note 15, at ~ 14; Bodenheimer, supra note I, at 45. 
344. CLARK, supra note 23, at 658; see also supra note 48. 
345. A stepparent's duty to support may arise statutorily, see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 501 (1980) 
(duty imposed on stepparent when natural parents cannot supply child's minimum needs); or it may 
arise from the in loco parentis status, see, e.g., Kaiser v. Kaiser, 93 Mise. 2d 36, 402 N. Y.S.2d 171 (1978) 
(liability for stepchild from in loco parentis status ends at death of natural parent or divorce of stepparent 
and natural parent). 
346. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92. 
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basic stepparent is unlikely to receIve custody of stepchildren, whether the 
marriage ends by divorce or by death.347 
Similarly, in England, no parental rights are conferred on the basic step par-
ent.348 A court might find that the duty to support the stepchildren exists, but 
the finding depends less on the intentions of the stepparent to be in loco parentis, 
and more on the simple fact that the stepchild is a member of the stepparent's 
household.349 The English approach further differs from the U.S. approach in 
that the duty to support does not end necessarily at divorce. The English divorce 
court can order support from a stepparent if it finds the stepchild to be a "child 
of the family."350 The likelihood of custody or even access being given to the basic 
stepparent, as in the United States, is low, but English inheritance law does 
protect the dependent stepchild from being disinherited as a matter of law at the 
death of a testate or intestate stepparent.35 ! 
For the U.S. stepparent who wants as little responsibility for stepchildren as 
possible, intentional inaction is the best way to accomplish that goal. Not even an 
in loco parentis status exists in those circumstances.352 In England the stepparent 
cannot place the stepchild in so vulnerable a position; the considerable latitude 
given the courts, by the inheritance laws to distribute estates and by the domestic 
proceedings laws to order support during and after a marriage for a child of the 
family, offers a safeguard for the English stepchild. The "child of the family" 
status cannot be discarded merely by the intention of the stepparent. 
The consequences of seeking a modification of the spouse's custody order also 
differ in the two countries. Given the new social policy encouraging an alterna-
tive to stepparent adoption, the likelihood that the English stepparent will get 
joint custody is high. English laws delineate the rights and duties conferred on 
the joint custodian353 and describe the mechanisms for sharing custody jointly, 
347. See supra notes 132-33 & 141 and accompanying text. See Collins v. Gilbreath, discussed fully in 
notes 126 and 151; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Patricia L.F. v. Malbert J.F., Jr., 278 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 343,420 A.2d 572 (1980) (stepfather is not a natural parent; in custody decisions, the proper 
standard to apply is the comparison of natural parent and unrelated third party, with presumption of 
custody to the natural parent, regardless of stepfather being in loco parentis). 
348. In re N., 1974 Fam. 40. 
349. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text; Bissett-Johnson, supra note I, at 297. 
350. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
351. See Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1971, ch. 63. 
352. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88. 
353. E.g., Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, at sec. 4(1)(2), restricts the power to appoint a testamen-
tary guardian to the natural mother or natural father; Children Act 1975, at sec. 12(1), states that a 
person with legal custody does not have the power to consent to adoption; Matrimonial Causes Rules 
1977, at r. 92(8), states that the person with custody cannot change the child's surname unilaterally. See 
also supra note 273 and accompanying text. CRETNEY, supra note 28, at 525-30, discusses the custodian-
ship orders that will be available to stepparents who are not required to seek modification of a custody 
order in the divorce court. Certain sections of the Children Act 1975 that have not yet been put into 
effect describe the rights, duties, mechanisms for dispute resolution, and other details of a "custodian-
ship order" made in favor of a stepparent and a natural parent. Children Act 1975, Pt. II; CRETNEY, 
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even among three or more persons, and for resolving disputes among custo-
dians.354 This clarity encourages the success of a joint custody arrangement in 
England. 
But the idea of joint custody, shared by a natural parent and stepparent, is a 
new idea in the United States.355 Since this country has not developed a strong 
social policy against stepparent adoption, a judge in the United States has no 
support, from statute or theoretical model, for a decision granting joint custody 
to a stepparent, especially if the noncustodial natural parent objects. Even the 
term "joint custody" has a different meaning: in the United States, the term 
generally refers to custody shared by the two natural parents after the divorce.356 
The role of a stepparent in a joint custody arrangement has not been studied in 
this country. 
B. Proposals for Change 
For the U.S. stepparent who wants family security and as many parental rights 
and duties as possible, only adoption will suffice under the present laws. Yet 
adoption is a "statutory guillotine" severing the child/parent relationship 
forever, a harsh penalty for the natural parent who lost custody in the divorce 
and for the natural grandparents and other relatives.357 Professor Bodenheimer 
has suggested that courts grant joint custody to stepparents who have been 
denied stepparent adoptions.35B If the child, the stepparent, and the custodial 
natural parent desire, suggests Bodenheimer, the court should change the 
child's surname and eliminate the noncustodial natural parent's visitation rights 
and support obligations.359 
Bodenheimer's suggestion and similar proposals360 are attempts to create a 
middle course, an alternative that gives the stepparent parental authority and 
responsibility while the legal status of the noncustodial natural parent continues. 
The proposals are inadequate, however, because they fail to elaborate on what 
specific parental rights and duties the joint custodian stepparent will exercise, 
supra note 28, at 525. Cretney feels that other laws now in effect, the Guardianship of Minors Acts 1971 
and 1973, fail to clarify these issues for custodians and joint custodians appointed under the divorce 
court's jurisdiction, and for guardians appointed by testament, by deed, or by the court. Id. at 438-40. 
354. Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 1978, sec. 13. See CRETNEY,supra note 28, at 
485 and 485 n.26. 
355. See Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345 (1979). 
356. Id. at 360. For an example of a state statute that uses the term to refer to custody shared by the 
two natural parents, see 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1003 (Purdon 1983). See generally W. WEYRAUCH & 
S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 515-21 (1983). 
357. See supra notes 41 and 270. 
358. Bodenheimer, supra note I, at 45. 
359. /d. 
360. See Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1. at 621. See also supra note 146, for suggestions by Oppel 
and Williams. 
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other than the duty to support and the right to physical custody of the child.361 
By changing the child's surname and eliminating the noncustodial natural par-
ent's duty to support and right to visit, the proposals suggest a scheme that severs 
the relationship between the child and natural parent as surely as if there had 
been an adoption. Lacking the legal right to visit, the noncustodial natural 
parent can be barred by the joint custodians from all contact with the child.362 
The relationship between the child and noncustodial natural parent would exist 
in name only.363 
In addition to those major flaws, the proposals fail to address the problems 
faced by stepfamilies in other areas of concern. The laws governing testate and 
intestate distribution can operate to exclude stepchildren from a share of the 
stepparent's dependency,364 and the proposals do not suggest remedies.365 Ques-
tions of custody at the death or divorce of the joint custodians are answered 
lightly or not at al1.366 
This Comment proposes that the English approach to the issue of stepparent 
adoption be enacted in the United States. The English approach began with a 
policy decision that permissive escalation of stepparent adoption is not desir-
able,367 and a recognition that the adoption laws were not designed for stepparent 
adoption and are ill-fitted for that use.36S Once the English reached that decision, 
the laws governing adoption and custody were revised to reflect the premise that 
stepparent adoptions are permissible only when adoption is better than any 
other alternative.369 
361. See generally Bodenheimer, supra note 1, at 45; Note, Stepparent Custody, supra note 1, at 621-29. 
362. The natural parent, lacking a court-ordered right to visit the child, can be barred from doing so, 
since the right to determine the child's associations is a right of the legal custodian. But see In re Adoption 
of Children by F., 170 N.J. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986 (1979) (children granted a right to visit natural 
father even after adoption by stepfather, and guardian ad litem appointed to enforce right even if 
natural mother and stepfather object). 
363. No real relationship exists between a child and the parent who cannot visit and who need not 
support. Intestate succession rights continue, so that the natural parent might inherit the child's estate 
and the child the estate of the natural parent; the child continues to bear the parent's surname if the 
natural parent is a father; and the natural parent can reacquire all parental rights and duties, as well as 
custody, if circumstances in the future so require. These rights stand as legal eventualities, but the daily 
relationship is non-existent. Such an arrangement does not differ from the severity of adoption in any 
way but permanency. 
364. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text. 
365. The author of Stepparent Custody states that changing the succession statutes to permit stepchil-
dren to inherit from their nonadopting stepparents is "unnecessary generosity." Note, Stepparent 
Custody, supra note I, at 624. This criticism assumes that the statutes would be changed to allow 
stepchildren to inherit from both their stepparents and from their noncustodial natural parents, and 
that the stepparent's natural children would be disinherited. See id. A more equitable change, however, 
could be enacted. 
366. The author of Stepparent Custody suggests that the standard currently applied at the divorce of a 
natural parent and a stepparent, that is, treating the stepparent as an unrelated third party opposing a 
natural parent, should continue to apply. Id. at 625-26. 
367. MADDOX, supra note 1, at 170. See Houghton Report, supra note 15, at chap. 5. 
368. Oppel, supra note 1, at 632. 
369. Children Act 1975, ch. 72; see supra text accompanying note 210. 
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Recognition that a stepparent adoption differs in motivation, circumstances, 
and practical effects from a conventional adoption is the first step in deciding 
that stepparent adoptions should be treated differently by the legal system. 
Complete elimination of adoptions by stepparents of legitimate children is inap-
propriate, since a stepparent adoption is desirable under some circumstances.37o 
A requirement that such adoptions occur only when the noncustodial natural 
parent consents would bar adoption when that parent withholds consent mali-
ciously; but laws allowing courts to waive consent can be used too permissively by 
judges who approve of stepparent adoptions, permitting all applications to 
succeed.371 
Requiring, however, that courts grant stepparent adoptions only when the 
adoption is better than all other available alternatives is not sufficient. The range 
of alternatives available must be broadened, and the legal position of the step-
parent who does not adopt must be strengthened, while laws that hinder the 
stepfamily's stability are reformed. For example, succession rights should be 
enlarged, so that a stepchild will not be disinherited simply because the steppar-
ent failed to write a will.372 Joint custody must be defined to include custody 
shared by a natural parent and a stepparent, and the rights and duties conferred 
by joint custodial status should be delineated in the law. 
The only issue that caimot be resolved equitably is the issue of surnames. The 
English generally refuse to allow the stepchild's name to be changed.373 
370. See supra note 266. Stepparent adoption is certainly desirable, for example, when the natural 
parent has abandoned the child, when the natural parent's parental rights have been terminated 
because of child abuse, or perhaps when the natural parent has died. Stepparent adoption is also 
appropriate for families like the Dyers, who proposed to emigrate to a distant country, especially when 
the natural parent and the children consent. 
371. Extensive research by Oppel disclosed not "a single case concerning a step-parent adoption in 
which His Honour [County Court Judge O'Hearn] had refused to dispense with a natural parent's 
consent." Oppel, supra note I, at 643. A high proportion of the adoption cases in Nova Scotia come 
before Judge O'Hearn, who has stated: "I have yet to see a case where the decision (to dispense with the 
natural parent's consent) did not prove the better solution." Id. (quoting In re Hill, 20 N.S.R.2d 528, 534 
(N.S. Co. Ct. 1975». Oppel adds that there is no doubt this judge personally approves of stepparent 
adoptions, a position apparent from his judicial and extra-judicial statements. Id. "The adoption cases 
decided by Judge O'Hearn are highly instructive, if for no other reason, than that they illustrate how 
the psychological 'set' of a trial judge may affect the outcome of a case." Id. at 644. Judge O'Hearn has 
granted the stepparent adoption application of a stepfather who had been married only three months at 
the time of application. See id. at 643 n.62, for cases involving stepparent adoptions and Judge O'Hearn. 
See also supra note 175. 
372. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; Berkowitz, supra note 75, at 224. 
373. Matrimonial Causes Rules, r. 92(8), states that the parent with custody cannot change the child's 
surname by deed poll. See supra text accompanying notes 319-21. See W. v. A. (child: surname), [1981]1 
All E.R. 100, for a discussion of whether to grant a change in surname. In that case, the parents married 
in 1966, had two children, divorced in 1971, and each remarried. Custody of the boy and girl had been 
granted jointly to the natural parents. The mother's second husband was an Australian who desired to 
return permanently to Australia with his stepfamily. The natural father agreed to the move, provided 
the children retained his surname. The court of appeal upheld the lower court's decision to deny the 
request. 
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Bodenheimer suggests the choice belongs exclusively to the child and the joint 
custodians.374 Compromise alternatives might include appending the step-
father's surname to the natural father's surname or changing the entire stepfam-
ily's surname to the surname of the natural mother or stepmother, to signify 
creation of a new family unit. 
Maddox dismisses all the suggestions simply and straightforwardly: 
There should be a general acceptance of two last names within a 
family. Mailboxes should read Smith and Jones. A society that wants 
nearly a million divorces a year cannot afford to be embarrassed 
when the children in a household don't have the same surname as 
their father and mother. Like millions of other children, they have 
their father's name and their mother has remarried. What is difficult 
about that?375 
As the custom of women changing their surnames at marriage wanes and women 
retain their maiden names, mailboxes can read Smith and Brown and Jones, or 
Cooper and Koffman and Plante.376 But, until the United States and England 
accept the multiple surnames found in families in other cultures, the unadopted 
stepchild will carry the surname given at birth. 
The English system clearly defines the rights and duties of the stepparent who 
is given joint custody. The system preserves the legal relationship of the step-
child and the noncustodial natural parent, while giving the stepparent the legal 
incidents of parenthood, and protects the stepchild by giving courts far-reaching 
equitable powers to require support from stepparent and natural parent alike 
and to distribute estates fairly. Implementation of the English system in all fifty 
states will be more difficult to accomplish than implementation was in England, 
where a single act of Parliament can legislate for the entire country. The first 
step toward acceptance of the English approach is to publicize its existence and 
to continue research into its success. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States should follow the English lead and discourage the increas-
ing use of adoption by stepparents to adopt their legitimate stepchildren. Sever-
ance of a child's relationship with one half of its natural family is harmful and 
inappropriate, to the child, to the noncustodial natural parent whose relation-
ship with the child is destroyed permanently and without a finding of unfitness, 
374. Bodenheimer, supra note 1, at 45. Professor Bodenheimer suggests that the court ought to grant 
a request by the child and the joint custodians, i.e., the natural parent and stepparent, to change the 
child's surname to that of the stepfather, regardless of the opposition of the natural father. [d. 
375. MADDOX, supra note 1, at 17l. 
376. See generally STANNARD, supra note 106. The stepfather keeps his name, the natural mother 
retains her maiden name, and the children keep their birth surnames, regardless of the mother's 
current marital status. 
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and to the natural grandparents and other relatives. Stepparent adoption should 
be limited to those cases in which adoption enhances, rather than diminishes, the 
child's family; for example, adoptions of a stepchild who is illegitimate, or who 
has been abandoned by an absent natural parent and has no other familial ties, 
or whose absent natural parent has died, with no other familial ties, are appropri-
ate stepparent adoptions. 
Changes in other laws that affect stepfamilies also are needed to ensure the 
welfare of the stepfamily for which adoption is inappropriate. Joint custody for 
stepparents should be encouraged, and the respective rights and duties, as well 
as mechanisms for dispute resolution, should be determined and developed. 
The law on testamentary guardians should be changed to the English model, to 
permit appointment of the custodial stepparent jointly with the surviving natural 
parent, in order to maintain the continuity of the stepchild's relationships after 
death of the custodial natural parent. The equitable power of the probate courts 
should be expanded to allow the court to protect stepchildren after the death of 
a parent or a stepparent. Support obligations by stepparents with joint custody 
should survive the termination of the underlying marriage, and the stepparent's 
rights to custody and visitation at divorce or death of the spouse should be 
clarified. The stepparent's rights should be determined by the best interests of 
the child rather than by the legal status or lack of legal status of the stepparent. 
The stepparent in the United States is at present without any resort other than 
to adopt. The English stepparent is not compelled to adopt his or her stepchil-
dren in order to establish a legal relationship; the joint custody system and the 
supporting laws in other areas of concern give the English stepfamily a secure 
legal position without resort to an artificial adoption and severance of the natural 
parent's relationship. The success of this approach is not merely theoretical. Its 
application in England is reassuring evidence that the system works and provides 
an adoptable model for this ·country. 
Susan F. Koffman 
